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EXECUTIVESUMMARY 1 
This report, commissioned as part of a comparative study of the role of 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) m complex 
emergencies, examines certain themes in the role of international 
development and reliefNGOs in the lead up and response to the Rwandan 
genocide in the summer of 1994. These themes are: the capacity of INGOs to 
forestall complex political emergencies; their role in providing early warning 
of forthcoming emergencies and drawing international attention to them; 
their role in mapping the development of emergencies, once underway; their 
operational response to such emergencies; and the ethical, security, and 
political dilemmas that such emergencies produce. Attention is also paid to 
the question of state failure and state collapse - complex concepts which 
apply in various measure to different elements of the events in Rwanda. 
Three episodes related to the emergency are considered in depth. First, to 
capture the question of early warning of, drawing attention to, and 
forestalling complex emergencies before they come into being, it was 
decided to examine INGO response to the crisis of February/March 1993, 
when ca. 400,000 people fled their homes in the face of a major rebel 
offensive. Second, to capture both mapping and operational response 
issues, and because of the sheer scale and importance of it, the massive 
influx of refugees into Goma, Zaire in July 1994 is treated as a focal point. 2 
The third focus of investigation is the security problems and ethical 
dilemmas encountered by INGOs while delivering aid to refugees in Zaire. To 
1 This report was read in draft form by a number of colleagues, for whose comments I am grateful. 
Responsibility for errors rests with the author. A large number ofNGO and UN staffmembers with 
nothing to gain from doing so gave unstintingly of their time, experience, and expertise to help me 
produce this report: I owe them all a debt of gratitude, and hope that some of them fmd value in this 
report and the wider project. The author would like to thank, in particular, Jude Rand, Rowland 
Roome, Emery Brusset, Jean-Marc Mangin, Kevin McCort. Beverly Neufeld, Lindsey Hillsum, and 
Anne Lloyd-Williams, as well as other members of the project team, for invaluable assistance in the 
production of this report or commentary on early drafts. A large number ofNGOs and UN agencies 
made both files and staff members available, and facilitated various aspects of the author's field visits 
to the region: particular thanks (in chronological order) to OXF AM UK. CARE Kenya, CONCERN 
(Nairobi), CARE Rwanda., and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs(Nairobi.) Special thanks to 
Risper Oliech and Hillary Muskoya, and the rest ofthe staffofCARE Kenya, for providing me a 
friendly base in Nairobi; and to Rowland Roome and the staff of CARE Rwanda for help, hospitality, 
and good humour - and for putting up with yet another visiting consultant - during my visit to 
Rwanda. Thanks to Aidan Hartley, formerly Reuters Rebel Correspondent for East Africa, for 
invaluable discussions about the Rwandan civil war, a place to stay, and a few drinks too many; and 
in particular to Anne Macintosh, formerly of OXF AM in Rwanda, for reading drafts, saving me from 
embarrasing errors, supplying critical documents, and giving frequently of her time, experience, and 
commitment. This report is dedicated to the numerous development and relief workers and 
journalists I met whose courage and commitment to Rwanda through the worst oftimes stands in 
eloquent response to many recent attacks on the professionalism and commitment of the humanitarian 
and media communities. 
2A similar influx ofrefugeesinto Ngara, Tanzania in May 1994 was also considered, but it was 
decided that the issues presented by Ngara were present as well in Goma, and Goma had relevant 
complexities that Ngara did not- principally in the weakness of the Zairian state authority relative to 
that of Tanzania. 
narrow this very large topic, this section of the report focuses on one camp 
where those issues were perhaps most acutely felt, namely Katale camp, 
from which a number of INGOs ultimately withdrew in the face of the 
security problems and ethical dilemmas posed therein. 
The experience of the Rwanda emergency is proving to have been a 
watershed in international relief and development INGOs' perception of 
themselves and their roles in the international reliefsystem. It was certainly 
the largest, most complex, and arguably most sophisticated IN GO response 
ever. The immense suffering of the Rwandan people during 1994- when fully 
60% of the population lost their lives or were displaced from their homes -
was also, ironically, a financial and public relations bonanza for these 
agencies whose raison d'etre is precisely to prevent such suffering. 
Moreover, it involved INGOs in a series of ethical and political dilemmas 
which saw them feeding and even hiring men and women who had 
committed crimes against humanity, and implicated them in the resuscitation 
of the otherwise failing regime which had conducted the genocide. These 
dilemmas were not unprecedented but were certainly more acutely felt in 
Rwanda than in previous emergencies, and INGOs are still seeking answers 
to the questions they raised. The Rwanda experience was thus 
simultaneously international INGOs finest hour, a financial bonanza, and the 
cause of a crisis of role and identity: at one and the same time a proud and 
profound confirmation of INGOs' role, and a shattering of the paradigms 
which underpin that role and give it coherence. Among the paradigms which 
was thrown into doubt by Rwanda - as by other emergencies - was the ideal 
of neutral humanitarianism. 
This report reaches a number of conclusions about INGOs' performance in 
Rwanda. 
• First, performance on the conventional, technical aspects of emergency 
humanitarian response were for the most part, given the extraordinarily 
traumatic conditions, what they should have been: swift, and sufficient to 
the task. 
• Second, in looking at the massive escalation of violence in Rwanda in the 
summer of 1994, it is evident that no INGO had clear early warning of it, nor 
were many INGOs involved in attempts to forestall a potential escalation of 
the violence of the civil war. There were some few exceptions to this: a 
handful of INGOs engaged in conflict resolution/prevention type activities 
during the civil war years. Of course, these ultimately failed, along with 
broader peacemaking efforts by the international community. 
• Third, the way in which those forestalling efforts failed provides counter-
evidence to the claim that INGOs, being close to the ground, close to local 
actors, have a structural advantage in early warning and forestalling roles. · 
• Fourth, ironically, part of what undermined INGOs potential early warning 
and forestalling capacity was precisely their technical efficiency: the nature 
of some INGO responses to the growing humanitarian crisis in Rwanda 
before the genocide undermined what might have been an important 
opportunity to process the increasing signals of escalating violence. 
• Fifth, INGOs performed badly on questions of mapping and intelligence of 
the humanitarian aspects of the emergency, once it had broken, but no 
worse than other elements of the humanitarian response system, such as UN 
agencies, and in part performed badly because of the UN system. 
• Sixth, on the question of drawing international public and political attention 
to the emergency, INGOs arguably performed better than other actors. 
• Seventh, INGOs provided relief assistance to a large number of combatants 
of the Rwandan civil war and genocide who had no claim on such 
assistance, but did so in the absence of other options, coping as they were 
with the neglect of the state actors - principally Zaire and also the Security 
Council permanent members - responsible for creating secure conditions for 
humanitarian operations. 
• Eight, INGOs' own efforts to tackle the ethical and political issue of 
providing aid to combatants were ineffective, and did little to support other 
international agencies' efforts to generate robust international action. 
• Ninth, the humanitarian response to the refugees in Goma, in the absence 
of a security framework, had the unintended consequence of resucitating the 
genocide regime in exile, and thus lay the groundwork for renewed conflict in 
the sub-region. 
More profoundly, this report argues that INGOs were called upon in Rwanda 
to respond in neutral, humanitarian terms to a situation with political features 
which made neutrality morally compromising. In the context of the refugee 
camps in Zaire, neutrality translated into aiding and abetting a regime guilty 
of genocide. There were, however, three elements of that context well 
beyond INGOs' control: the failure of international security mechanisms to 
respond to the genocide itself in April through July of 1994; the effective 
failure of the Zairian state to fulfill its legal obligation to provide security for 
the Rwandan refugees; and the abdication of the residual responsibility on 
the part of the Security Council to deal with security in Zaire. This left 
humanitarian actors alone to deal with the consequences. It is far from 
surprising that under these circumstances INGOs found themselves stuck 
on the horns of a political dilemma, faced with a choice between feeding the 
henchmen of genocide or allowing legitimate refugees to suffer. 
This was not the first time humanitarian agencies faced this dilemma, nor is it 
likely to be the last. Indeed, as this report was being drafted, in October 
1996, INGOs were facing similar issues in eastern Zaire, in part as a result of 
the way in which the problem was not handled in 1994. The events 
surrounding the 'Banyamulenge' uprising- the fighting in the Kivu region of 
eastern Zaire, the further displacement of large numbers of refugees, the 
presumned massacres of a substantial number of those refugees, and the 
broader Zairian civil war, waged with Rwandan support - stemmed directly 
from the unfinished business of the Rwandan civil war and emergency. 
For this reason, the question posed by Rwanda is an enduring one: will 
INGOs continue to adopt the stance of neutral humanitarianism when states 
and their security mechanisms have failed to create a context in which that 
stance is politically meaningful and morally valid? The answer to that 
question will be a central one in the politics of humanitarianism at the end of 
this century. 
NOTE ON METHODS AND SOURCES 
The enormity of the Rwandan experience- both in terms of the immensity of 
the disaster itself, and the scale of the response - necessitated choices about 
which aspects of it to cover in a limited research project. The choices were 
for the most part dictated by the intersection of the thematic concerns, the 
exigencies of data collection, and the coverage of other literature. Because 
the project as a whole seeks to examine complex political emergencies from 
the level ofiNGO experience (as opposed to donor!UN level), a decision was 
taken to keep the methodological focus for the report on interviews with 
NGO personnel involved in various stages of the crisis and response._ 
This proved difficult, as those people are now spread far and wide across 
the map of current humanitarian crises, and as the report evolved more use 
than anticipated was made of documentary sources. The fact of the 
geographical diffusion of the personnel involved also dictated an 
unintended overemphasis on the large and medium-sized international 
INGOs, as the law of numbers determined that relevant staff from these 
organisations could be found in the cities where the research was conducted 
- London, Washington, New York, Ottawa, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, and 
Kigali. Many of the small INGOs which sprung up in the Rwanda response 
are now, simply, nowhere to be found. More grievously, many of the 
personnel of the local NGOs, particularly those involved in human rights 
advocacy before the genocide, were early victims of that tragedy, while 
others have been implicated in it. 
The resultant focus on the medium and large international INGOs is both 
positive and negative. The downside is rather less breadth than would 
otherwise be the case; the upside is a wider applicability of the issues 
tackled herein- for it is these INGOs which will (and indeed currently do) 
respond to the next complex emergency either in east and central Africa or in 
other parts of the world. 
Throughout the report, references are made where possible to other 
literature which covers issues in greater depth. In particular, close attention 
is paid to the findings of the OECD Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance in Rwanda) Discussions with NGO personnel during the 
preliminary phases of researching this project revealed a common perception 
that the Evaluation more fully covered the Rwanda operations as 
experienced at the UN and donor levels than at the NGO level. This report, in 
many senses, can be read as a companion piece to that work, written as far 
as possible from an INGO perspective. 
A further notation issue: INGOs such as CARE and Medecins sans 
Frontieres (MSF) which have many different country offices, with separate 
organisational identities, are identified by their full name when first identified 
in a section but only by their partial name for subsequent references. Thus, 
references to CARE Canada in a particular section will be followed by 
references simply to CARE, until it is necessary to re-identifY the country 
office. If, for example, CARE Canada and CARE Kenya are both referred to in 
the same section, they will be identified in full. 
Many of the sources used in this report are confidential. Where they are not, 
they are referenced either in the body of the text or in footnotes. A list of 
sources at the end of the document lists organisations who provided 
documents, even when those documents were confidential. Over 50 
interviews were conducted for this study, and most of the persons involved 
are identified; some chose to remain unidentified. Finally, in some instances 
materials gathered through the author's involvement in the Joint Evaluation 
of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda were used in the production of this 
report; in all such instances, any relevant restrictions on citation or 
quotation continue to be respected. 
3ofwhich the author of this report was contributing author for Study II on conflict management and 
early warning, and research assistant for Study III, on humanitarian response. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PRELUDE TO A GENOCIDE: BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RWANDAN CIVIL 
CRISIS 
l.l.l THE CIVIL WAR 
A brief history of the Rwandan emergency might begin with 1 October 1990, when an 
armed refugee movement, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), 
invaded Rwanda from southern Uganda. The invasion was itself the culmination of 
previous strife of a type frequently seen in Africa, and elsewhere: victims or losers in a 
conflict seek refuge in a neighboring country, which then becomes a base for invading 
their homeland. In this case, large numbers of Rwanda's Tutsi minority, who had been 
the losers in a violent struggle for political control in Rwanda during the decolonisation 
process, fled to surrounding countries. The largest concentration of Tutsi refugees was in 
southern Uganda. Repeated efforts by the refugees to return had been of no avail until a 
generation of Rwandans born in exile launched a new invasion in 1990. The objective 
was to permit full and free settlement in Rwanda - a demand consistently denied by 
Rwanda's President Habyarimana - and to force the regime to accept power sharing 
arrangements that would give Tutsis significant political representation in the 
government. The attack was propitiously timed to take advantage of support from 
Uganda's President Museveni4 and a decline in the political and economic fortunes of 
the Habyarimana regime. 5 
(For some notes on the economic and political situation under Habyarimana, see 
Appendix 3.) 
Invasion was quickly met with intervention. On October 5, France sent roughly l SO 
paratroopers from bases in nearby Central African Republic to bolster the Habyarimana 
regime. These troops did not engage the RPF, as some believe, but rather backstopped 
the Forces Armees Rwandaise (FAR)6 in Kigali, securing the airport and other major 
sites. Zaire also sent troops to Rwanda, and these did engage the RPF, notably in Gabiro 
where their presence was insufficient to stop the first major RPF victory of the war. 
Zaire's troops were recalled shortly after that defeat.7 
The fortunes of the RPF underwent a sharp but temporary decline after the capture of 
Gabiro. Their commander, Major-General Fred Rwigyema, had been killed on the first 
day of fighting in a fluke of war. Shortly after Gabiro was captured, two more senior 
4n should be noted that the situation ofthe Tutsi refugees in Uganda was becoming untenable. By 
supporting the RPF's invasion of Rwanda, the Museveni regime killed two birds with one stone: 
repaying a debt to his Tutsi allies and solving a difficult internal political issues. 
5In the late 1980s, a series of economic shocks had crippled the Rwandan economy, which until that 
point had been relatively stable, albeit poor. Principal among those shocks was the 1989 collapse in 
world price of coffee, Rwanda's major export product, which caused a sharp decline in the country's 
balance of payments situation. This, along with other ills, forced Rwanda to begin negotiations with 
the IMF on a Structural Adjustment Program, adopted just after the outbreak of civil war, a fate 
Rwanda had avoided longer than most sub-Saharan African countries. 1989-90 saw a continued 
decline in the country's economy, coupled with a sharp rise in unemployment, both of which were 
then exacerbated by drought in a number of parts of the country. For details of the economic crisis, 
and its political impact, see in particular Newbury (1992) and JEval, I. 
6The French acronym is used in this report because the English acronym, RGF - for Rwandese 
Government Forces - is to easily confused with RPF. 
7Belgium also sent troops to Rwanda at this time, but only long enough to protect Belgian 
nationals. Zaire's troops were withdrawn in part because, unpaid and ill-disciplined as they were, 
they were wrecking havoc wherever they were deployed, looting, raping, pillaging - a foretaste of later 
events. 
commanders were killed in a FAR ambush. Disoriented by the loss of leadership, the RPF 
retreated, splitting into two groups, one which melted into the forests and swamps of 
the Akagera National Park in the east, and one which stole along the Rwanda-Uganda 
border to the Virunga National Park in the northwest. 
In Virunga, the RPF regrouped under Major Paul Kagame, a charismatic Tutsi in his 
thirties who had earned his leadership position through years of tough fighting: first with 
the Tanzanians against Idi Amin, then with Museveni against Milton Obote, and fmally 
as Museveni's Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence. Recalled from a training program 
at Fort Levenworth, Kagame provided the RPF with the necessary leadership to sustain 
the rigours of life in the high altitudes and cold weather of the Virunga mountains. From 
this vantage point they launched a series of guerrilla attacks in northern Rwanda which 
succeeded, by mid-1991, in making the northern part of the country a region where the 
FAR could not travel except at high risk. In November 1991, the FAR launched a strong 
attack on the RPF's position in the Virungas. When that attack failed, the momentum 
swung back to the RPF's favour. During the first months of 1992, the RPF consolidated 
its position in the north, creating a de facto RPF-held zone extending along almost the 
whole Uganda-Rwanda border. 
1.1.2 THE NEGOTIATIONS 
While the fighters fought, the talkers talked. Notwithstanding the somewhat peripheral 
nature of Rwanda to major western powers, the_October 1990 invasion quickly triggered 
a series. of regional and international peacemaking efforts. Just two weeks after the 
invasion, Tanzania called a regional meeting of the Heads of State of Rwanda, Uganda 
and Zaire to discuss the situation, and, fearing further refugee flows, remained actively 
involved and became host as well as "facilitator" for the subsequent peace talks. The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Secretariat was also active in recognition of the 
organization's principle that African states have a primary responsibility to address 
regional conflicts. Other actors were soon informed or engaged - the (informal) 
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL), the European Union and, 
more peripherally, the UN. Additionally the governments of Belgium, France and the 
United States at various times helped to move the process forward. The Belgian 
government became actively involved within days of the invasion, pushing forward a 
regional mediation process which achieved a cease-fire within four months. 
All this activity was ineffective; the initial success of regional diplomacy was short-
lived. A formal cease-fire signed at N'Sele, Zaire on 29 March 1991 lasted only to mid-
April, when fighting resumed. The limits of regional diplomacy were revealed when a 
second cease-fire broke down in early 1992. It required a push from France - supported 
by more limited but parallel diplomatic suasion by the US Under Secretary of State, 
Herman Cohen - to get the conflicting parties back to the negotiation table. The 
European Union, Canada, Switzerland, the Vatican and others also counseled peace talks. 
The result was the Arusha peace process, launched in the summer of 1992, which 
concluded in a comprehensive settlement signed in August 1993. 
1.1.3 THE ARUSHA PERIOD (JUNE 92- AUGUST 93) 
The Arusha process brought together the RPF, the ruling party, and Rwandese 
opposition parties which had grown up during the civil war. Supporting the negotiations 
were international organizations which had a stake or a role in Rwanda, including the 
OAU, western donor countries, and the UN. The Tanzanian government formally acted 
as a "facilitator", and undertook a sustained and skillful mediating effort that was critical 
in bringing about an agreement. 
From the start of the Arusha process in June of 1992 until February 1993, an uneasy 
cease-fire curtailed RPF activities. The Arusha negotiations began to outline the course 
of a peaceful transition of power from the Habyarimana regime to a broad based regime. 
However, by January 1993 the Arusha negotiations were stuck over the details of 
power-sharing arrangements. A government massacre of Tutsis in the north of the 
country at the end of January signaled the unwillingness of Kigali hard-liners to agree to 
proposed compromises. Frustrated by the lack of progress and enraged by the killings, 
the RPF launched an offensive in February 1993. 
The RPF offensive was a major success. Thousands of the FAR's troops fled in the face 
of the advancing enemy, many of them deserting the army altogether. The offensive 
shocked Kigali and threw the government forces into disarray. \Vith the FAR scattering 
in front of them, the RPF fought to within 23 miles of Kigali, stopping only in the face 
of French reinforcements and international pressure. RPF, French and Tanzanian 
military sources agree that had the RPF chosen at this moment to continue to fight, the 
French reinforcements would have been insufficient to prevent total FAR defeat. 
In New York, the UN system responded to the disruption of the peace process. In 
March, the Secretary-General sent a team to Rwanda which helped bring the parties back 
to the negotiating table. The Security Council also approved a military observer mission 
to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border, designed to stop Ugandan supplies flowing to the 
RPF. 
As the negotiations neared completion, the role of the peacekeepers was extended. The 
Accords called for the deployment of a Neutral International Force to oversee the 
implementation of the agreement, the principal feature of which was the creation of a 
transitional broad based regime leading to democratic elections scheduled to be held 22 
months after the signing. A new national army composed of units from both sides in the 
civil war was to be formed; the rest would be demobilized. Invoking Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter, the UN Security Council voted to deploy a UN Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) to oversee the installation of the transitional government and other 
parts of the peace agreement, in particular, to assist in disarming and demobilizing the 
two armies. 
1.1.4 BUILDING AND SUBVERTING THE PEACE 
The signing of a peace agreement in August 1993 and the deployment of UNAMIR two 
months later - i.e. the initial success of what may be characterized as preventive 
diplomacy - did nothing to halt the rapid deterioration of the political situation iJ! Kigali 
in the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994. As peacemakers and peacekeepers attempted to 
put the Arusha structures in place, their opponents - hard-line forces in Kigali who lost 
out in the Arusha process - worked to knock them down. As the pro-Arusha forces 
attempted to establish the institutions and mechanisms of power-sharing, the extremists 
laid the ground work and then set in motion a radical alternative to the Arusha power-
sharing plan: a mass genocide against the Tutsi population and a return to war against 
the RPF. 
Their efforts were bolstered by the assassination of President Ndadaye in Burundi in 
October 1993, and the mass killings which followed. In that month, a five month old 
experiment in democratic power-sharing in Burundi collapsed when the Tutsi-dominated 
army launched what turned out to be an abortive coup which nevertheless undermined 
the nascent democratic system. This in tum generated a week of mass killings, Hutus 
forces took their revenge on Tutsi civilians and the Burundian army retaliated with 
bloody force. Later estimates would place the dead at between 35,000 and 50,000 split 
equally between the two ethnic groups, but at the time in the region the killing spree was 
widely reported to be far larger - as high as 150,000 to 200,000. The reality was bad 
enough, and sent tens of thousands of Burundians fleeing from the country. 
The killings in Burundi helped push Rwanda faster down the slope into collapse and 
genocide. Since February 1993, it had been moving steadily down that slope, but until 
October 1993 there was still a reasonable hope that the course could be reversed. After 
the killings in Burundi, the course was firmly set. Among other things, the October 1993 
killings in Burundi sharply increased these fears of the Rwandan population. To western 
ears, the Habyarimana regime's propaganda that the RPF were returning to Rwanda to 
re-impose slavery and other evils on the Hutu, rang shallow and cynical; yet across the 
border in Rwanda's sister country, a Tutsi military was executing Hutus in their masses 
(the stories of Hutus massacring Tutsis did not make into the extremist propaganda.) 
Moreover, the killings had come only months after Burundi had attempted a democratic 
experiment similar to that now being proposed for Rwanda. 
(For more details on the role of ethnicity in the political discourse of Rwanda, see 
Appendix 3.) 
What is more, the UN peacekeeping force being sent to Rwanda to protect the 
populations from such a breakdown (this was not UNAMIR's mandate, but it was very 
much how it was perceived in Rwanda), was late arriving: UNAMIR Force Commander 
Dallaire and his advance mission had the misfortune to arrive in Rwanda on the same 
day as the assassination in Burundi. Not only was UNAMIR immediately required to 
divert some of its (not over large) force to the Burundi border region, but the stark 
contrast between the late, partial arrival of UNAMIR and the killings in Burundi meant 
that UNAMIR started life in Rwanda under a cloud of Rwandan skepticism (which turned 
out to be well-justified.) 
1.1.5 DESCENT INTO GENOCIDE 
The deployment of UNAMIR in Rwanda did little or nothing to slow Rwanda's 
disintegration. By February 1994, the program of assassination and disruption reached a 
fevered pitch with the killing of leading opposition member, and key moderate, Felicien 
Gatabazi. On February 23, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) special 
representative Michel Moussali warned that Rwanda faced "a bloodbath of unparalleled 
proportions" unless action was taken to restore stability. In the end, it was precisely 
when action was taken to restore stability - when Tanzania and the OAU convened an 
emergency session of the Arusha principals on April 5 - that the bloodbath was 
unleashed. The plane carrying Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira from that 
meeting was shot down on April 6, and genocide begun in Rwanda. The Times report of 
the event is quoted here in its entirety: 
The leaders of Rwanda and Burundi were killed last night when their plane was 
shot down by a rocket, according to UN officials, as it approached the airport at 
the Rwandan capital of Kigali. 
The Rwandan emergency had arrived. 
The genocide was planned and to a large extent controlled by a tightly organized group 
of extremists from within the Habyarimana power structure: members of the ruling 
Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND) party, leaders of 
the Presidential Guard, the interahamwe and impuzamugambi militias, and members of 
the hard-line political grouping, the Coalition pour le defense de Ia Republique (CDR). 
In the first days of the killings, this group massacred the Tutsi population of Kigali and 
wiped out the ranks of moderate politicians and civil society leaders, most of them 
Hutu. Over the next three months, unchecked by any international force, the extremists 
systematically slaughtered Tutsi populations across the country, killing hundreds of 
thousands of people before the RPF's victory on 17 July 1994 drove them into final 
retreat. 
The central motive for the genocide was to retain political power and the economic 
rewards that went with it. Given the history and ethnic struc.ture of Rwanda, the political 
contest over who would control the state machinery had developed along a deepening 
majority-minority divide. Members of the Hutu majority community which planned, 
organized, and directed the genocide stood to lose power as a result of the power-sharing 
arrangements negotiated in Arusha. Additionally, some feared that the RPF would use its 
legitimized entry into national politics and foothold in the new national army to 
engineer a coup. In either case, the Tutsi were perceived as the winners. The fear which 
this prospect generated among the Hutu population - and which took extreme forms 
among some of the power-holders and their followers - must be understood against the 
historical memory of Tutsi overlordship before and during the colonial period, and the 
practice of treating power transfer as a totalistic, zero-sum game and a 'winner-takes-
all' attitude. As the direction of civil war became clear, and power-sharing was on the 
horizon, Hutu extremist ideologues deliberately exploited this history to whip up ethnic 
fears, and used this fear to create space for their program of mass killing. They were 
aided in this by the repeated displacement many Hutus experienced as a result of the 
civil war, and by events in Burundi, which lent credence to their radical portrayal of the 
'Tutsi devils' of the RPF. 
It is critical to be clear that the genocide was not spontaneous, not an eruption of 
ancient tribal hatreds, as it was quickly portrayed by the western media. Rather, this was 
a planned, coordinated, directed, controlled attack by a small core, with the support of 
the senior elements of the state machinery, and arguably as many as 100,000 but 
possibly as few as 25,000 'henchmen' - a large number of people, especially at the 
larger estimate, but virtually all under the direct control of central authorities. 
All sources estimate deaths in the Rwandan genocide between 500,000 and 1 million, 
with the bulk of estimates falling at the larger end of the spectrum. Analysis of pre-
genocide census data, counts of refugee populations, and estimates of deaths, lead to an 
informed estimate of 800-900,000 deaths, the figure chosen by Studies II and III of the 
Joint Evaluation, as well as by Gerard Prunier, in his The Rwanda Crisis (1995). The 
rate of killing in Rwanda, roughly 75,000 victims per week sustained over a twelve week 
period, exceeds that of Cambodia, and equals the industrialised Nazi death machine at its 
most active point. 
It is this massive program of slaughter - arguably the most intense program of killing in 
all of human history - that set the stage for the "Rwanda emergency". As the genocide 
regime fled from defeat at the hands of the RPF, it drove in front of it the largest wave 
of refugees ever witnessed. As the RPF broke through government lines in Byumba and 
swept through the east of the country, a quarter of a million refugees fled in front of 
them, crossing into Tanzania at the beginning of May. The RPF then fought a 
protracted battle for Kigali, which they won on June--. As they chased the retreating 
FAR across the west of the country, a further 2 million Rwandans fled their homes. 
Over a million fled into Zaire when the last government stronghold in Gisenyi, fell on 
July 14th. Just under a million more sought refugee inside Rwanda when a French 
intervention force - Operation Turquoise - created a 'safe-haven' in southwest Rwanda. 
The refugees outflows from the renewed civil war, as well as the mass of displaced 
persons inside Rwanda, were the focal points of INGO response to humanitarian crisis 
which flowed out of the genocide. 
1.1.6 STATE FAILURE, STATE COLLAPSE 
The 1994 crisis in Rwanda is often referred to as one a series of cases of "state failure" -
the others, depending on whose list is used, including Somalia, Zaire, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, sometimes former Yugoslavia. The literature on complex political emergencies 
connects the phenomenon to this concept of state failure, or state collapse as it is 
alternatively called. This is so far an ill-defined concept, and its application to Rwanda 
has been made only loosely. Nevertheless, some notes on it are worth making. 
The humanitarian emergency in Rwanda was not a product of a case of state failure 
comme les autres. Whereas in Somalia, for example, state failure had literally been that 
(the failure of the state to use its legitimacy or impose its authority on groups within 
the national territory) the dynamics of state collapse in Rwanda were radically different. 
In Rwanda, the state itself- still functioning in a technical sense - turned on a portion of 
its own population, with genocidal purposes. The horrific efficiency of the genocide, as 
it was being conducted by the state itself, illustrates that in a technical sense the state 
machinery was still active in Rwanda during the period of genocide. State failure has a 
different sense in this phase of Rwandan events: a radical failure of the state to fulfill its 
legal and moral responsibilities to its citizenry - indeed, a radical perversion of this 
responsibility, a twisting of the concept of state protection to mean the destruction of a 
'threatening' element of society. 
Genocide in Rwanda produced a massive humanitarian 'emergency' in the real terms of 
the commission of tremendous human rights violations, but not 'the Rwandan 
emergency' to which the international community responded on an unprecedented 
scale. That second emergency was created, indirectly, by the July victory of the RPF 
over the Rwandan regime, and, directly, by the successful efforts of the fleeing members 
of the former Rwandan regime to drive over a million Rwandans from their homes in an 
effort to create a base for themselves in other territories, as it became clear that the 
genocide had 'failed' - in that it was not complete and in that it had not turned the tide 
in the civil war. The refugee and displaced persons crisis itself, then, was not caused by 
state collapse but was the cause of it. For at this stage, the Rwandan state did collapse, 
albeit even then only in a particular sense. 
As the former regime fled RPF victory, they looted and wrecked the physical and 
financial apparatus of the Rwandan state, as well as driving the population of western 
Rwanda from their homes. The RPF government established in July found itself without 
resources with which to attempt reconstruction or reconciliation, and without a 
population in over half of Rwanda. In this sense, they governed a state which had 
collapsed. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made here between a situation such as in 
Somalia where the executive core of the state fails to function, and the case in post-
genocide Rwanda, where the new executive core functioned, even enjoying international 
legitimacy and support, but lacked critical resources to extend its legitimacy or authority 
beyond the core. 
Thus the Rwandan state both failed (in the sense of responsibility) and then collapsed 
(in the sense of capacity), but not simultaneously, and with a different causal 
relationship to the humanitarian aspects of the crisis than is sometimes assumed. The 
key points here are: -
* the genocide (the most extreme phase of the humanitarian emergency) was a function 
of a state turning on a part of its population, not of state collapse; 
* the state collapse which did occur (post genocide), did not cause the refugee 
movements but rather was caused by them, and by the deliberate looting of the fleeing 
regime; 
* the Rwandan state post-July collapsed in a functional but not a political sense. 
The distinctions made here between typologies of state collapse are significant in terms 
of their implications for international response. The international community's efforts 
in Rwanda after July 1994, for instance, operated under different circumstances from 
those which prevailed in Somalia, in that they were supported by and (at least in 
principle, but insufficiently in practice) supportive of a legitimate government. 
Furthermore, the major element of INGOs response to the Rwandan emergency took 
place in Zaire, itself a count!)' which scholars referred to in terms of failed states. The 
situation in Zaire is one in which the central authorities in Zaire - specifically President 
Mobutu and his Presidential Guard - do not attempt, and are probably not able, to ensure 
order and stability throughout the count!)'. In the eastern province of Kivu, where the 
Rwandan refugee emergency occurred, central Zairian authority is remote. This 
certainly exacerbated the difficulties faced by INGOs and UN agencies in attempting to 
provide relief to refugees in this region. This is further complicated, however, by the 
fact that the central authorities in Zaire, such as they are, were allied to the 
Habyarimana regime, and continued to support that regime when it fled into exile. Some 
of the difficult security and political issues which arose in Zaire did so because Zaire as a 
state has partially collapsed or failed, ie. was weak systems of authority, but they also 
arose because Zaire chose to fail, chose not to fulfill its international legal 
responsibilities to the refugee population. 
Thus, INGOs responding to the Rwandan emergency did so in the extraordinary 
circumstances of the Rwandan state under Habyarimana radically failing to protect its 
citizenry; the Rwandan state under the RPF experiencing collapse in technical terms; 
and the Zairian state under Mobutu having partially collapsed systems of security and 
authority and moreover failing - in the ordinary sense - to use what state capacity it did 
have to create conditions of security and order within which INGOs could operate. 
These conditions, as demonstrated below, left INGOs facing political and security 
challenges far beyond their competence but also well outside the bounds of their 
responsibility. 
1.2 - PRELUDE TO AN EMERGENCY: BRIEF HISTORY OF INGO INVOLVEMENT 
IN RWANDA. 
1.2.1 - INGOS BEFORE THE GENOCIDE 
It is in the nature of the charity business that the less important a country in the 
realpolitik of arms and economics, the more important it is likely to be in the pantheon 
of humanitarians. Certainly Rwanda, politically marginal though it was, had long been 
the site of significant INGO involvement. A number of international INGOs had a long-
standing presence in Rwanda: OXF AM and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) since the late 
1960s, CARE and others since the early 1980s. INGO work in the. country was broad but 
fairly conventional. Seed distribution, provision of agricultural tools and implements, 
irrigation: these were the staples of INGO efforts to alleviate poverty in what was then 
(and is still) one of the world's poorest countries. OXFAM, CARE, and MSF were the 
three largest international INGOs. (Other major humanitarian agencies included Belgian 
Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN humanitarian 
agencies.) 
The onset of the civil war in 1990 was not, for most INGOs, a source of major 
disruption. Some INGOs concentrated their work in the southwest of the country where 
average land holdings were smallest (ca. 0.25 hectares, compared to ca. 2.0 hectares in 
the northeast, the breadbasket of the country.) The southwest was largely unaffected by 
the civil war, which was confmed until 1993 to a zone along the northern border with 
Uganda and a zone along the northeastern border with Tanzania. Other INGOs, 
including CARE, which had programs in Byumba province in the northeast, experienced 
some disruption when the initial invasion occurred in that region. However, FAR 
reverses of RPF advances soon saw the fighting disperse towards Virunga National Forest 
in the northwest and the Akagera National Park in the east, neither of which were areas 
with particularly intensive INGO activity. For the most part, from the first invasion in 
October 1990 until the February 1993 offensive mentioned in the previous section, 
INGOs continued to work in Rwanda in traditional development modes of operation. 
1.2.1.a - Efforts to Forestall an Escalation of the Crisis 
In the years since the Rwanda crisis, many have asked whether development and relief 
INGOs could not play a more substantial role in preventing humanitarian emergencies, 
rather than simply responding to them. For the most part, international INGOs in 
Rwanda from 1990 to early 1993 did not take on any role in dampening the existing 
conflict or preventing any potential escalation. There are two important and one minor 
exceptions. 
First, Catholic Relief Services apparently used its position in Kigali, a quite influential 
position which came through its strong connection to the Catholic church, to support 
broader church efforts to deal with the question of ethnicity and to promote acceptance 
of the idea of sharing power within the Habyarimana regime. Few details of this process 
have been made public, and CRS' efforts were for the most part bound up in efforts by 
such figures as the Papal Nuncio to have the church play a constructive role in the 
Rwandan peace negotiations. That these broader efforts were ultimately a disastrous 
failure does not necessarily mean that CRS's efforts were wasted or misguided. What 
little evidence of these efforts exists suggests that CRS's work was a small part of a 
broader process and did little of either positive or negative impact. In any case, CRS is 
something of a case apart for INGOs, given its strong ties to the Catholic church, which 
gives it clout, but may deny it impartiality. 
The lessons of the second exception are more widely applicable to international 
development and relief INGOs. In 1992, OXF AM launched a program to tackle the 
violence and conflict in Rwandan society. OXFAM was, according to diplomatic sources, 
one of the few agencies in Rwanda with "power in Kigali." (The others were 
Caritas/CRS, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).) It's influence 
came not through its high level connections among official circles in Kigali - indeed, 
OXF AM staff may be surprised to learn that they were considered to have power in 
Kigali- but through its important role as a the major funding agency for 'civil society' 
groups. OXF AM used its position to attempt to diminish the recourse to violence in 
Rwanda society. Most visible among their efforts was a program called Education for 
Non-Violence and Democracy (ENVD), run under the broader umbrella of a Catholic 
Church program called 'Justice et Paix'. 8 The experience illustrates many of the 
challenges that face INGO efforts to engage in this sort of political programming. 
The ENVD program was advertised through local parishes and brought people together 
and sought to raise their awareness of issues such as ethnic relations (which were rarely 
discussed in Rwandan society), democratic process, and human rights. Its strength was 
that the issues addressed were those raised by participants. The program had some 
success, at least in that OXF AM received calls from participants for more opportunities 
to engage in this type of dialogue. However, the program was limited in scope -:.. never, 
for example, attempted in Kigali, the absolute power centre of Rwandan society. In 
1993, as the crisis in Rwanda began to deepen, the ENVD was in hiatus, in a period of 
adjustment as the lessons of the early round were absorbed. 
In hindsight it is clear that the program suffered from major weaknesses; these 
weaknesses are clearly recognised by OXF AM staff who dealt with the program, either 
in Kigali or Oxford. Most important is the question of having run the program through 
the Catholic Church. Anne Macintosh, the country director responsible for the 
program, later argued that OXF AM might have done well to have involved the 
Protestant churches. OXF AM did attempt to involve Rwandan human rights 
organisations, but without succees.9 The Catholic Church itself was grappling with the 
thorny issue of ethnicity in its own ranks.l 0 Indeed, as has now become clear, many of 
8 Other activities included channeling information to Amnesty International and other human rights 
agencies. 
9 As many observers of the Rwandan human rights scene have noted, Rwandan human rights NGOs 
had by 1991-92 fallen into infighting, and many were increasingly associated with particular political 
parties. 
1 OThe Papal Nuncio in Kigali at the time had been sent out specifically to help the local church 
come to grips with the divisive ethnic relations within its own ranks. He had begun to register what 
appeared to be some small successes when the genocide was launched - with the connivance and 
the church's leading figures, up to and including the Catholic Bishop of Kigali, Msr. 
Vincent Nsengyumva, were deeply implicated in the planning and later the commission 
of the genocide. Moreover, several of the people who OXF AM had worked with and put 
through the ENVD, themselves turned out to be accomplices in the execution of the 
genocide. It is important to note, however, that other members of the Church were 
actively, and passionately involved in the search for non-violent solutions to Rwanda's 
political crisis, including Jean-Pierre Goding, one the ENVD's principal animators. 
Finally, one other international INGO attempted to play a role in the peace process. 
London staff of Christian Aid who had ties to Uganda's President Museveni, held secret 
meetings in Bujumbura with the RPF and the government of Rwanda. However, in three 
years of research into conflict management efforts in Rwanda, I encountered no one -
including among the RPF - who believed that the Christian Aid initiative had any 
relevance. Kigali-based diplomats of the period dismissed Christian Aid's initiative as 
"trivial." 
(Local and international human rights INGOs engaged in other acttvttles which are 
relevant, though not strictly within the remit of this report - see Appendix 2). 
1.2.1.b - Shifting to Emergency Programming 
By early 1993, INGO's development work in Rwanda was thrown on its head by the 
consequences of the February 1993 RPF offensive. In retrospect, this is a critical 
turning point both in INGO's experience and in the crisis itself, and is explored at some 
length below, as the first of three detailed episodes through which thematic issues are 
explored. Suffice it for now to note that the offensive produced large numbers of 
displaced persons, and forced INGOs onto an emergency footing. 
This process was furthered in October 1993 when political violence in Burundi produced 
large numbers of refugees (JEval, III, 29). At least 375,000 refugees crossed into 
southern Rwanda, and another 250,000 fled to Tanzania. (On top of these figures, a 
further 300,000 were displaced inside Burundi, a some tens of thousands also crossed 
into Zaire.) Because the INGOs in Rwanda were already on an emergency footing as a 
result of events there, they were quickly able to divert some of their capacity to dealing 
with Burundi refugees in the southern province of Butare, where they were concentrated. 
By the time this process was fully in place, Rwanda was, from a humanitarian 
perspective, completely on an emergency footing, and so it remained until Aprn 1994, 
when the genocide was launched. 
In the first chaotic days after the assassination of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, INGOs 
scrambled not to respond but to escape. This was not a panicked reaction or an 
irresponsible one, but a response to attacks on local NGO staff and real threats to 
security of all INGO personnel. INGO country directors (CDs)ll claim, with 
justification, that there was no time in the first week to attempt to focus on what was 
happening around them; getting their staff to safety was an absolute and consuming 
priority. Efforts to secure local staff were far from successful; every major international 
INGO lost local staff to the genocide. Local INGOs often fared worse, with many human 
rights organisations being wiped out in the first days. Having supported efforts to loosen 
the regimes grip on power was the equivalent of a death warrant. 
What staff could, fled. Many international personnel were evacuated out of Kigali by 
air, while others crossed by land to neighbouring countries. Agency staff were dispersed 
throughout the countries of the region, and it was some time before they were able to 
regroup and consider their responses. Many local staff were unable to escape at this 
participation of most of the Churches leading figures, including Msr. Nsengyumva. 
11 The acronym is used as shorthand for the variety of names NGOs give their senior in-country staff 
member. 
stage: many parts of the city were under ftre; some international INGO staff being 
evacuated by Belgian, French, and UN military convoys were told not to bring local 
staff along, for fear that having Rwandans in evacuation convoys would endanger all in 
the convoy. Many international INGO staff now recall leaving their Rwandan colleagues 
behind as one of the most traumatic elements of the entire gruesome episode. 12 Some 
international INGO staff were able to use their authority - and a healthy dose of bravery 
- to save the lives of local staff threatened by militias, giving these a chance to escape 
Rwanda. Many more were killed than saved. 
1.2.l.c Early Warning of the Genocide 
The genocide took the international INGO community entirely by surprise. Many had 
been tracking the political situation, and knew that the Arusha peace was unstable. In 
early 1994, Martha Campbell of CARE wrote: 
A cette epoque beaucoup de gens esperaient que Ia paix finale serait proche et 
que les camps auraient disparus endeans les duex ou trois mois, aussitot que Ia 
zone FPR serait a neoveau ouverte. Helas, depuis Iors Ia situation n'a pas du tout 
evolue. Les accords d' Arusha n'ont pas ete mis en application. Le 
gouvernement elargi au FPR n'est toujours pas en place. Beaucoup de questions 
restent en suspens et personne ne peut predire ce que reservera demain. L' avenir 
du pays reste plus qu'incertain. 
But no INGO, CARE included, saw what was coming in either its scale, its swiftness, or 
its brutality. 
This was not because there were no signals of what was brewing. In hindsight, there were 
relatively clear signals about what was coming in Rwandan society: rampantly extremist 
propaganda in various media sources, notoriously Radio et Television Libre Milles 
Colines (RTLM), distribution of parish lists to central military committees, orders sent 
to local administrators for to provide standby transport and logistical facilities for 
"national security purpose", the open training and of militias, the arming of civilian 
groups. In hindsight, these and other activities signaled the oncoming escalation. At the 
time, however, nobody in the international community, INGOs included, formed a clear 
picture of the form and scale of the coming escalation of violence. 
-
Having failed, along with the rest of the international community, to prevent or foresee 
the escalation of the crisis, INGOs were left scmmbling to respond to the escalation of 
its humanitarian consequences. For the three months between April and July, when the 
genocide was halted by the victory of the RPF over the Habyarimana regime, INGOs 
and their UN counterparts played a game of 'follow the refugees'. This entailed the 
following movements. 
1.2.2 INGOS AFTER APRIL 1994 
1.2.2.a (April-May) Tutsi refugees fleeing the genocide entered Mbaram region of 
southern Uganda, where the situation was quickly stabilised by the UN and INGOs 
operating in cooperation with both the Ugandan authorities and the RPF. 
1.2.2.b (April-May-June) A large number of Tutsis were displaced by fighting in the 
RPF-held zone. The same UN agencies and INGOs dealing with new Rwandan refugees in 
Uganda launched cross-border opemtions from Kabale, on the Uganda-Rwanda border. 
INGOs operating in this zone were kept under tight control by the RPF, who insisted, 
for the most part, that INGO staff be accompanied at all times by RPF officers, and 
12In the aftermath of Rwanda, some agencies- notably ActionAid- have made commitments to their 
local staffthat the agency will stick with them even if they have to withdraw from a country of 
operation. How this might be implemented in emergency circumtances is unclear. 
limited all but a handful of INGOs to daytime operations. The consensus among INGOs 
who ran operations in this region is that those operations quickly became quite routine, 
in the sense that the RPF provided strong security and tight control, although 
unimpeded access to camp populations was a problem. Operating conditions in this 
region did not, as might have been expected, have any of the characteristics of 
operating in a 'failed state'. Indeed, the following extract from a letter by a UN 
coordination official to a donor, suggests the opposite: the official described an INGO 
meeting in Kabale where "22 INGOs and UN agencies [were] almost falling over each 
other to work in the RPF zone. The RPF are having a great time playing agencies and 
INGOs against each other. A spectacle worth observing." 13 
1.2.2.c - (April-May-June) Among the most vulnerable populations were civilians in 
Kigali. Several INGOs attempted to reach Kigali from the RPF held zone but were 
blocked from doing so both by the RPF in some instances and by the UN itself, which 
refused to condone INGO access to Kigali during the genocide (see Appendix 4 on 
operations in Kigali.) 
1.2.2.d - (May onwards) The first highly publicised involvement of INGOs in Rwanda 
came at the beginning of May when more then 200,000 (initially reported as 300,000) 
mostly Hutu refugees fleeing RPF advances in the north east found refuge in western 
Tanzania. The mass, rapid influx of refugees into the Karegwe region of Tanzania, 
particularly Ngara town, sparked a huge emergency relief operatio_n by international 
INGOs - the first time since the onset of the genocide that the INGO community was 
able to reach Rwandans in any numbers outside of a war-zone. 
l.2.2.e - (May-June) As the genocide was implemented, a small number of Tutsis fled 
to northern Burundi and eastern Zaire. A small number of INGO operations were started, 
especially in Goma, to meet the needs of these refugees. These small operations later 
overwhelmed by a far larger outflux to the same area. 
l.2.2.f - (May-June) As noted above, as the RPF advanced into western Rwanda, 
roughly two million persons fled towards the Zaire border. As many as a million of these 
halted their flight in southwestern Rwanda when France sent Operation Turquoise into 
the zone, and established a safe haven. INGOs and UN agencies were able to access the 
displaced populations in this region from bases in northern Burundi. 
1.2.2.g - (July onwards) When the last government stronghold fell on July 14th, 1.2 
million refugees fled across into Zaire. This episode is explored at greater length in 
Section 2.2 below. 
1.2.2.h - (June-July onwards) Victories by the RPF in the east and centre of the 
country increased the access to Rwanda by INGOs operating out of Kabale, Uganda. 
When the RPF finally defeated the FAR in Kigali, and shortly thereafter in the west of 
the country, INGOs were able to start operations in Kigali itself, and shortly thereafter 
to start meeting the needs of the internally displaced from Kigali rather than Burundi. 
L2.2.i - (August onwards) On August 22nd, the French army pulled out of the safe 
haven, and out of Rwanda altogether. In advance of this, fearing RPF retribution, 
several hundred thousand displaced persons from the zone fled across into Zaire, at 
Bukavu. However, another several hundred thousand stayed in internally displaced 
camps inside Rwanda. 
1.2.3 ORA WING A TIENTION TO THE CRISIS 
l3The number of agencies continued to grow. A July 2nd meeting was represented by the following 
27 agencies: World Relief, CARE, AMDA, PSF, Solidarite, MdM, ACORD, GED, MtD, 
CRS!Rwanda, UNICEF, MSF/B, CRS/Caritas, OXFAM, SCF, AMREF, CDC, WHO, MSFIH, 
USAID. ItalCoop, Samaritan's Purse, ICRC, World Vision, UNOMUR UNAMIR. and UNREO. 
While scrambling to respond across the Great Lakes Region, INGOs also worked hard to 
draw international attention to the Rwandan crisis. This was done principally through 
three tools. First, INGOs used their position within their home countries to attempt to 
move political opinion, largely through discrete lobbying in the form of letters and 
phone calls to relevant MPs, ministers of government, and other decision makers. This 
strategy of private lobbying, from what little concrete evidence is available, appears to 
have helped shape particular decisions concerning emergency aid once other strategies 
had raised public awareness of the crisis among the constituencies of the decision 
makers. The most notable lobbying effort was that of OXF AM, which used its policy 
department quickly to produce a manuscript on the situation, was the first humanitarian 
agency to refer to the situation in Rwanda as a genocide, and lobbied hard - though 
ultimately ineffectively - in New York, Washington, and London to generate a more 
substantive political response to the crisis.l4 On May 3rd, OXFAM worked with other 
groups to host a vigil in London, which walked to the steps of Parliament to raise 
awareness of the genocide. 
Most effective in terms of raising public awareness of the crisis was the second strategy, 
a highly effective campaign to work with journalists covering the Rwandan crisis, and to 
use their media to put forward not only an interpretation of events and call for action, 
but also to highlight INGOs role in the response. This had two elements. First, INGOs in 
Zaire and Rwanda quickly added public relations staff to their teams, and went out of 
their way to provide journalists with access to camps and to the affected populations. 
INGO workers were frequently seen on evening news programs in Europe and North 
America commenting on the evolving crisis. By providing journalists with access to the 
situation, INGOs in return received extensive coverage which made a significant 
difference to the amount of public money raised for the response. More significantly, 
INGO public relations personnel are convinced - reasonably - that by increasing public 
awareness of the crisis they oiled the wheels of government emergency aid donations, 
and generally increased the flow of resources coming into the response. 
While certainly valid, this argument also points to a problem with this system, namely 
the conflation of two tasks into one media strategy: raising awareness and fund raising. 
The need to raise funds drove a need to have profile, and thus INGOs not only provided 
journalists with access to the emergency, they ensured that the journalists cameras 
captured pictures of their logos displayed on tents, cars, t-shirts, There were c§rtainly 
abuses of this system: one doctor who served with the UK charity Medical Emergency 
Relief International (MERLIN) told stories of another medical INGO allowing a camera 
crew to take patients out of operating theatres and into mock theatres constructed in 
the open air, "where the light was better." From the anecdotes told by journalists who 
covered the story, it would appear that such abuses took place not irregularly, but were 
certainly not the standard practice of the major INGOs in the field. More worrying was 
the systemic feature of this system, namely competition among aid agencies for 
journalistic coverage. Analysis of the coverage from Rwanda and Zaire at the height of 
the crisis suggests that analysis of the crisis itself took a backseat to profile raising. 
Finally, some INGOs undertook fundraising campaigns which were designed not only to 
raise profile and funds but also to convey a political message. Most notable in this regard 
was MSF's "Doctors can't stop genocide" campaign, which drew on their experience of 
providing emergency medical relief in the middle of the genocide (see Appendix --) to 
incite more active engagement in the political and security aspects of the crisis. This 
campaign appears to have been successful in raising public awareness of the crisis, but 
l4oxFAM's efforts during the acute phase of the crisis built on a longer term effort to raise 
awareness in the international community of the deteriorating situation in Rwanda. To this end. 
OXF AM had among other things worked with journalists to attempt to increase coverage of and 
attention to Rwanda. 
was not complemented by a sophisticated lobbying effort targeted directly at decision 
makers. 
Ultimately, INGOs can take credit for having been the principal source of public 
information about the crisis, and for having kept the issue alive for decision makers in 
the aid and emergency relief donor communities. Less successful were efforts to generate 
an effective political response to the underlying politics and security elements of the 
crisis itself. This distinction would play itself out again as the crisis evolved, when 
INGOs sound themselves facing a political and ethical dilemma which required action 
from action from international security mechanisms, an issue explored below in the 
third episode of the emergency to be considered in detail. 
Turning to those episodes, a core focus of the report is on a distinction the one made in 
the paragraph above, namely the technical sophistication of INGOs which contrasts 
with less impressive political capacity. The tension between their high level of 
operational capacity and their much lower political capacity is explored in the section 
which follows. The section explores three 'episodes' of the crisis in an attempt to 
highlight the thematic concerns of the report: early warning and forestalling, mapping 
and intelligence, and operational response. The first episode, INGOs' response to a crisis 
of internally displaced persons in 1993, is explored to provide a window on the tension 
between early warning/forestalling questions and the technical operations of INGOs; the 
second, INGO responses to the Goma influx in July 1994 details the operational 
capacity of INGOs but contrasts it to weaker performance on mapping and intelligence; 
and the third, which reviews security, political, and ethical concerns in one camp near 
Goma in the fall of 1994, attempts to provide an overall assessment of the political 
impact of INGO operations in the Rwanda crisis. 
PART 2: EPISODES OF THE RWANDAN EMERGENCY 
2.1 - ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS: RESPONDING TO THE INTERNALLY 
DISPLACED, FEBRUARY 1993 
If there was ever a period during which INGOs might have been able to hear and process 
the signals of the momentum to the genocide, it was in the summer and fall of 1993. 
Growing extremism in Rwanda was most concretely evident in an increase in the number 
of 'small' massacres of Tutsis in various parts of the country - two or three hundred 
killed every time a concrete step towards power-sharing was taken. It was precisely such 
a massacre that prompted the February 1993 RPF offensive. The humanitarian 
consequences of that offensive produced a quantitative increase in INGO involvement in 
Rwanda, and a corresponding qualitative shift in the nature of that involvement, one 
which diminished their sensitivity and intelligence capacity precisely when these were 
needed most. 
On February 8th, 1993, the RPF broke out from their front lines a few kilometres south 
of their headquarters at Mulindi. Mulindi is at the northern end of the highway which 
leads from Kigali, through the major northern city of Byumba, to the Ugandan border at 
Gatuna. The RPF advanced southward along this route, as well as striking southwest 
towards Ruhengiri, which they quickly captured. Within days the RPF had tripled the 
area under their control. As noted above, the FAR's resistance was decidedly we~ and 
by February 22nd, the RPF had moved to within 23 kilometres of the capital, Kigali. 
France rushed two waves of reinforcements to the country. 
The RPF offensive produced a wave of roughly 400,000 internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). Almost 500,000 people had previously been displaced from northern Rwanda by 
fighting during the civil war. They had been temporarily housed in camps in Byumba 
Prefecture and elsewhere, and although some had returned to their homes with the 
signing of the July 1992 cease-fire, many remained in these camps. The total IDP 
population in Rwanda now swelled to almost 900,000. As Anne Macintosh, OXF AM 
U.K.'s country representative, later noted, this was the first of a series of disaster 
records that Rwanda was to set: the flood of IDPs in February 1993 was the largest, 
fastest displacement the humanitarian agencies had ever seen. IS 
Now the efforts of international INGOs to support sustained development in Rwanda-
as well as those efforts, such as they were, to build up the capacity of Rwandan society 
to resist an escalation of violence - were put on hold. The needs of the displaced persons 
were tremendous, as described by Steve Wallace, CARE Rwanda's country representative 
at the time of the crisis: 
The problems, faced by the displaced persons, included food, water, sanitation, 
shelter, and fuel. For shelter, the displaced persons improvised small huts, using 
wooden poles and thatched with banana leaves or other vegetation. For fuel, 
they use whatever they can find, mainly unseasoned wood and crop residues and 
weeds. Cooking is on the traditional, but energy inefficient, three-stone stove. 
The water and sanitation situations were desperate and contributed to the poor 
health of the displaced population. 
All the international agencies scrambled to respond to these needs. 
The international community's response to the IDP crisis was somewhat slow to get off 
the ground, but once moving was coordinated and effective. MSF was characteristically 
first on the scene, providing emergency health and sanitation services to several camps 
just north of Kigali. MSF asked OXF AM to get involved in providing water in three 
which held 95,000 people in total, not 15 kilometres from Kigali. OXFAM fulfilled its 
specialty niche: John Howard, a water engineer, flew out to Kigali to provide portable 
water systems and get them running; once operational, they were handed over to MSF 
and CARE. During the process of setting up water systems in these three main camps, 
the INGOs had the existence of other camps near Murambi brought to their attention, 
and investigated. In the end, INGOs collaborated on servicing a total of eleven camps. 
The breakdown of responsibility was essentially as follows. CRS, Caritas, and the ICRC 
were the main implementing partners of the World Food Program (WFP) in food 
distribution; OXF AM and CARE led on water and sanitation, supported by UN 
Childrens' Fund (UNICEF) and Caritas; MSF (H) and MSF (B) cooperated .on the 
provision of health services, with the assistance of the Belgian Red Cross (BRC), 
Medecins de Monde (MdM), and Action Internationale Contre Ie Faim (AICF); social 
services were the responsibility of OXF AM-Quebec, Caritas, and Terre des Hommes. 
These efforts were, by all accounts, ably coordinated by two bodies, the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the UN's Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs (DHA). Bimonthly coordination meetings allowed for a reasonably smooth 
division of responsibilities and a fair degree of collaboration. 
From an operational perspective, there is little to comment on about this first stage in 
the shift from development to emergency relief modes of operation. Response time was 
perhaps not what it might have been, but it was sufficient to the task. The needs of the 
IDPs were ably met, especially when the numbers eased somewhat at the end of March, 
with the signing of the Kinihara Cease-fire and the creation of a demilitarized zone 
(DMZ), which covered the RPF's territorial advances. The cease-fire and establishment 
of a DMZ allowed many IDPs to return home. This did not entirely end their reliance 
on humanitarian assistance, however, and CARE and other INGOs began work on 
providing the returnees with seeds, agricultural implements, and other necessary 
15There had in fact been larger displacements in history, notably "Operation Exodus" which in 1954 
removed 900,000 Vietnamese from North to South Vietnam, as the two countries were about to 
become known. However, that displacement was an organised, controlled movement over several 
months; the Rwandan IDPs moved over the course of a few days. 
materials to regenerate economic activity in the area. In general terms, the INGO 
response to the IDPs was considered by all concerned to have been highly successful - in 
technical terms, an excellent dry run of what was to follow. 
2.1.1 FOREST ALLING AND WARNING 
Technically excellent, but politically problematic, for the ironic consequence of the 
response was to dimish the INGO community's focus on the signals which now began to 
grow about the plan for a genocide. The 'quantity' of INGOs engagement with Rwandan 
society grew during this period, but - from a political perspective - the 'quality' declined. 
The impact of the IDP crisis was to shift traditional development activities to the back 
burner. More innovative programs tackling political issues- such as OXF AM's ENVD -
were largely displaced by relief activities. Development programs did not stop, but no 
longer did these have the full attention of the INGOs staff, whose energies, especially at 
the country director level, were increasingly geared to the management of the 
emergency operations. Although most agencies ran separate emergency teams, these 
nevertheless in most cases reported to the country representatives, who were thus 
responsible for coordinating their activities, etc. 
This diversion of energy and focus to emergency operations had a paradoxical impact. 
Most agencies began to loose track of the political situation in Rwanda at this critical 
time, paradoxically because emergency operations brought three things which should 
have enhanced INGOs' capacity to track and analyse political events - money, access to 
information, and a wider scope of movement within Rwanda- though that movement 
was sometimes curtailed when the regime imposed travel restrictions in areas where 
political violence was manifest. Instead, the emergency shifted INGOs into a mode of 
operations which, while it did not prevent them from 'hearing' what was going on in the 
populations with whom they were working with, focused their energies on other 
elements of their work, particularly the delivery of large volumes of relief supplies. 
Before the IDP crisis, most international INGOs in Rwanda had fairly limited movement 
in Rwanda. This was not a function of insecurity, although in the north of the country 
this was something of an issue. For the most part, INGOs restricted their own 
movements in the sense that few traveled outside the areas where they had specific 
programs. Their familiarity with conditions in the country was dominated _by the 
settings of their development projects. There were exceptions to this, of course, Caritas 
being the notable one, with projects across the country. 
The sudden onset of emergency conditions in February 1993 began to change this. 
Suddenly, INGOs who had projects in just one region of the country were now 
responding in a much wider territory, and traversed the entire country in fulfillment of 
operational demands. Their access to RPF held territory was also at this time 
considerably enhanced, with reseeding and other programs getting underway in the zone. 
Moreover, INGOs suddenly found themselves with large budgets and good access to UN 
and diplomatic sources of information. Whereas in 1992, money for basic equipment 
was scarce, by March 1993 funding for even such expensive items as cars and trucks was 
no longer a problem. Even more important, from a mapping and intelligence 
perspective, INGO country directors (CDs) began to find themselves included in the first 
circles of information sharing. One CD who had previously had access, only 
occasionally, to second-secretary level diplomats and low level UN staff, now had access 
to the UN heads of agencies and the first-secretaries of the various chanceries, both key 
political analysts and information conduits. 
Yet the combination of money, information, and physical access to the country did not 
result in an enhancement of INGOs' political analysis or monitoring of the situation, 
for two reasons. One was a simple lack of time. The management of emergency 
programs sapped time and focus away from both development programming and 
political analysis not only for those directly involved in delivering relief, but equally for 
the rest of the development community. According to CDs in Kigali at the time, and 
the managers to whom they reported in headquarters in the west, INGOs' knowledge of 
pre-1993 Rwanda was 'displaced' in the race to respond quickly to crisis conditions. 
The second reason for this loss of 'intelligence' was that in virtually all INGOs, 
emergency operations are run by expatriates flown in on short notice to meet relief 
needs. Expats coordinate with other expats to provide specialist services in water 
supply, distribution, health, social services, etc. These expats certainly hire large 
numbers of local staff, often from within the communities they are servicing. In 
contrast to development programs, however, these local staff are for the most part used 
in technical capacities, implementing programs designed by international experts. Local 
staff become less central in the development of programming. Little in the style of 
emergency response by most INGOs promotes sustained dialogue with the local 
community whose needs are being met. Relief programmes are usually pre-conceived and 
pre-packaged, often literally so. This allows relief agencies to respond quickly and 
efficiently to crisis which break at undetermined times in unspecified places, and clearly 
help save many lives. It does, however, have the drawback of tending to distance the 
INGO from the lives and politics of the communities in which they were operating. 
1993 saw a substantial growth in the expatriate population of Kigali and a 
commensurate decline in the meaningful contact between INGOs and local partners and 
peoples. This phenomenon was less pronounced for INGOs which used their 
development staff in country to run their emergency operations, CARE among them, 
and most strikingly pronounced for those INGOs which relied on separate emergency 
teams flown in for the purpose. 
This shift from development programming to emergency relief, with its important 
effects, started with the IDP crisis and escalated with the crisis provoked when Burundi 
refugees fled mass killings in that country in October 1993. Many of these ended up in 
southern Rwanda, and the shift to emergency footing in Rwanda was complete. Not only 
did the INGOs already present in Rwanda augment their emergency operations to deal 
with the influx, more INGOs arrived in the country to lend a hand, most with no 
experience in the region, let alone the country. The transformation of the INGO 
presence in Rwanda from a development oriented one with substantial contact with the 
local population, to one dominated by large international relief programmes run by 
expats, was now complete. According to many Rwandans, and a number of s~asoned 
international observers, this shift had the character of "an invasion of the kids" - a 
reference to the youth and inexperience of many emergency staff. 
Of course, such contact as development workers had with the local population had not 
helped them bridge the communication gap which existed, as noted above. Nevertheless, 
this contact had at least kept awareness of the issues in front of INGO staff. Had the 
greater resources of 1993 been combined with the more attuned mode of engagement of 
1992, potentially some more of what was happening in Rwandan society may have 
filtered through to INGOs. A partially deaf ear tuned to a signal is better than no ear at 
all. 
The loss of sensitivity to the local situation that the shift to emergency mode 
occasioned could not have come at a worse time. The months following the IDP crisis 
(March through October of 1993) were arguably the decisive moment in the struggle 
between those forces in Rwanda who sought to contain violence through negotiation and 
institution building, and those who sought to undermine the institutions and processes of 
peace with a massive escalation of violence (see Brief History of the Crisis, above.) It 
was at this stage that extremist forces in Kigali began to realise that they were on a 
losing course, both on the battlefield and around the negotiating table, and started to pay 
serious attention to developing a radical alternative. The groundwork for a genocide was 
laid at this time, right under the noses of INGOs and other international actors. 
Ironically, many of the young men who later joined the forces of genocide - recruited 
into extremist youth militias - came from the camps which INGOs were providing with 
emergency relief. The experience of repeated displacement (aid workers estimated that 
some Rwandans had been displaced 4 or 5 times before April 1994) created deep reserves 
of fear and ill will among this population, as did revenge atrocities which the RPF 
committed at this time (Ndiaye 1993, Prunier 1995). Looking back on the experience 
of responding to the IDPs, a senior ICRC official lamented the lost opportunity to see 
into this window on what was happening in Rwanda, to perceive its scale, depth, and 
intensity. One can only speculate on what might have been done differently had a more 
sensitive ear been attuned to this population in 1993.16 
2.2. 'THE DEVIL LEFT HELL AND CAME TO ZAIRE"17: INGOS RESPOND TO 
GOMA 
From an INGO perspective, the operational heart of the Rwandan emergency was the 
response to the influx of over a million refugees in Goma, Zaire in July 1994. At its 
peak, this operation comprised over 200 INGOs, and during its first eight months cost 
the better part of a billion US dollars. It was without a doubt the largest, fastest, most 
expensive, most complex ever INGO/UN response to a humanitarian crisis. 
That the genocide and renewed civil war would generate a refugee crisis was expected. Its 
size, timing, and location were issues which were debated among UN and INGO agencies, 
in an ineffectual exercise in humanitarian intelligence and crisis mapping, which left 
INGOs scrambling at the last minute to meet overwhelming needs. This poor 
performance on mapping and intelligence added to the difficulty of responding, though 
it makes it all the more impressive that as a group, UN agencies and INGOs managed to 
deliver relief supplies and services on the scale, and at the speed, that they did. 
That this response took place in Zaire - itself a state which many refer to as having 
failed or collapsed, at least in a partial sense - was a complicating and destablising factor. 
Some technical aspects of operating in Zaire are considered in this episode, while the 
political implications are explored in the next. 
2.2.1 THE INFLUX 
It was 5:00 am on the morning of July 14. For days, an influx of refugees had been 
expected in Goma, and the tension of waiting was beginning to take its toll on the few 
INGOs who had assembled advance teams. Then, suddenly, out of the semi-darkness an 
immense wall of humanity was moving down the road from the Gisenyi border. The 
refugees had arrived. 
By morning, an estimated 100,000 were crowded into the only open space they could 
find, the inner green of the traffic circle at Republic Square. By the evening, up to 
500,000 refugees were in Goma; within the next day and a half the number would break 
the I million mark. Every conceivable open area in Goma town was filled with crowds 
of refugees. INGO workers recall the overwhelming scale of the influx, the mass of 
people crammed into whatever comer they could find, the make-shift latrines dug in 
sidewalks by 'enterprising' Goma locals, eager to make money out of the crisis as 
Zairians have become adept at doing. They recall people sleeping beside those latrines, 
playing cards next to the corpses which were starting to accumulate. Most of all, they 
l6The ICRC, which was probably in a better position than any other agency with regards to contacts 
on both sides ofthe fight, did not play a conflict mitigation or prevention role. As a protection 
agency, ICRC avoids any sort of official mediation role which may threaten its independence, 
although in Somalia and elsewhere it has played the role of 'go-between'. 
17unidentified aid worker, quoted in a UNICEF Situation Report from July 3 I, 1994. 
retain the vivid memory the sheer number of people in the streets and passageways of 
Goma town, making it impossible to move, turning the ten minute drive down the 4 
kilometres from Goma town to the airport into a frightful 45 minute drive of honking 
and nudging refugees out of the way. 
The dense crowding was the essential element in the general chaos which now 
characterised Goma town. Kevin McCort's experience was typical. McCort and two 
colleagues flew into Goma on July 17th, and landed just in time for an RPF shelling of 
the airport. Scared by the sound of the incoming mortars, they took comfort from the 
French soldiers who were unloading planes without worrying about the incoming shells, 
seemingly able to tell from the sound that they weren't close enough to worry about. 
After spending a tense night at the airport, staying awake to the sound of small gun fire, 
McCort and his colleagues drove into Goma town. The 4 kilometre trip took them 45 
minutes. Angry FAR soldiers were roaming around causing havoc and enough insecurity 
for McCort to take the advice of the French soldiers, and wear a flack jacket. Somewhat 
incongruously, when they reached the Karibu Hotel, where CARE had established a 
temporary 'office', they found the restaurant working normally and serving quite edible 
food. 
2.2.l.a - Cause of the Influx 
What INGO workers called a "tidal wave of humanity" was caused by a breach in the last 
government floodgate, at Gisenyi. This last major government holdout outside of the 
French-held southwest, had been encircled by the RPF on July 12th, who began a mortar 
and shelling campaign the same day. On the 13th, the FAR fled Ruhengiri, pushing the 
refugees in front of them, creating for themselves a mobile human shield. Thousands of 
FAR soldiers crossed with the refugees. The tactic worked: when the RPF attempted to 
follow the FAR into Zaire, they were impeded by the sheer density of humanity along 
the streets of Goma. 
Afterwards, some would recall the number of soldiers and their weapons, and the degree 
to which they appeared intact as an army, and find it hard to connect that reality with 
the speed of the RPF's victories. The answer lies in the nature of RPF fighting tactics, 
which were an adaptation of the brilliant tactics used by Museveni in the Luwero triangle 
in the early 1980s - where many of the RPF commanders had their guerrilla training. As 
a smaller, mobile force without the quantity of crew-served heavy artillery available to 
the FAR, the RPF avoided full-scale assaults on FAR defensive positions. Throughout 
the summer campaign, whether in Byumba, Kigali, or Ruhengiri, the RPF adopted the 
highly successful ploy of wearing down the moral and fighting spirit of the FAR by 
encircling their defensive positions, engaging the FAR from a distance, and forcing the 
FAR into a nerve-wracking game of waiting. Eventually, in Byumba and in Kigali, the 
FAR would attack RPF positions; but the RPF, without having to defend a particular 
location, would simply fall back and let the FAR expend their energy and ammunition. 
The RPF would then open a hole in their encirclement, allow the FAR to retreat 
through it, and attack them from the rear as they attempted to fall back. By Gisenyi, 
the FAR had learned the pattern, and had no stomach for the fight. The difference in 
Gisenyi was the FAR's success in driving a human barricade between their retreat and the 
RPF advance. This barricade was the 1.2 million refugees to which the international 
community as a whole was now scrambling to respond. 
Critically for future developments in the crisis, the retreating FAR was for the most part 
allowed to cross into Zaire unchecked by the Zairian authorities. Although some units of 
the FAR were disarmed as they crossed, the majority were able to retreat across the 
border in full military formation, keeping their vehicles and weapons intact. The 
presence of coherent, armed units of the FAR, as well as numerous additional militia 
members, would have serious negative consequences for the development of the refugee 
crisis in later stages. These were not so noticed much initially, however, as INGOs and 
others scrambled simply to respond to the overwhelming numbers, not distinguishing to 
whom they were giving aid. 
That the Zairian army and local authorities allowed the FAR to cross into their territory 
unchallenged seems to support the contention that Zaire is itself a "failed state", or at 
the least a state on the brink of failure with weak internal administration. This analysis 
is not without its problems. Certainly, the Zairian central authorities have only limited 
capacity to control administrators and army units in the outlying regions of the 
country, which certainly includes Kivu province in which Goma is located. However, 
President Mobutu of Zaire also had limited will to attempt such control. Mobutu was a 
long-time ally and 'big brother' of Rwanda's President Habyarimana, and the Zairian 
army had been sent to support the FAR in the early days of the civil war. The points is 
that even if the Zairian state had the capacity to disarm the FAR as they crossed the 
border - and this is uncertain - it is highly questionable whether it would have chosen to 
do so. The central authorities in Kinshasa were happy to allow the analysis of weakness 
to excuse their failure to disarm the FAR - as they would be required to do under 
international law- but in fact this was more excuse than rationale. Until the fall of 
1996, when the lack of order in Zaire as a whole has threatened the centre, President 
Mobutu in particular has shown himself to be adept at deploying his Presidential Guard 
to very powerful effect to contain such threats. Had he chosen to do so in Goma, there 
is no doubt that Mobutu could have done much to contain the ex-FAR and militias 
freedom in Goma, a freedom which they would ultimately use to divert aid supplies and 
intimidate and murder refugees. Thus it is less 'state failure' in the political science sense 
of that term that was at issue, and more the deliberate failure of a state to fulfill its 
international obligations that allowed the creation of the untenable situation of a large 
'refugee warrior community' inside and surrounding the UN's camps in Zaire. 
2.2.2 MAPPING AND INTELLIGENCE: PRE-PLANNING FOR GOMA 
Despite the fact that the refugees were expected in Goma, agencies were left scrambling 
when they did arrive. The reason is a two-fold failure in mapping the developments of 
the crisis: the UN system bungled the mapping, and individual INGOs bought into the 
UN mapping decisions, despite the fact, in many instances, that their own intelligence 
and mapping systems contradicted that of the UN. Also, there were a series of local 
failures to communicate advance warning of refugee movements to key INGO actors on 
site. 
2.2.2.a - UN system mapping and planning 
Some of the details of a long and sordid story of the UN humanitarian system's mapping 
exercise in Rwanda are given in JEval, III,l18. It amounts to this: two contingency 
planning and mapping exercises were conducted, which contradicted each other. One was 
reasonably accurate but was buried by the system; the other was disseminated in the 
system, but was wholly unrealistic. In brief, the UN Rwanda Emergency Office 
(UNREO), created when the genocide started in April 1994, led a contingency planning 
and mapping exercise through May and June. This process, which had input from the 
UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (F AO) and other 
agencies, produced three scenarios: best case, a cease-fire which produced no refugees; 
worst case, a collapse of the Burundi/Rwanda border with Zaire in the form of an 
extension of the civil war and mass refugee flows; and a likely case scenario which 
estimated a total of 1.5 million refugees flowing into the Goma and Bukavu regions of 
Zaire - an underestimation by a few hundred thousand of the actual figures, but a 
reasonable planning estimate. This contingency plan had been prompted by a highly 
accurate analysis by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) about the 
displaced population being pushed west by RPF advances. 
Two things waylaid this contingency plan. First, it ran into political trouble at the 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Geneva and New York, when officials there 
argued that the plan would draw attention and coherence away from other efforts within 
the UN system to generate support for relief operations, particularly a Consolidated 
Appeal process at that time being undertaken by the combined UN humanitarian 
agencies. Second, it was released (at a meeting in Nairobi) on the same day on which 
France's Operation Turquoise was announced. Not only did that announcement draw 
attention away from the plan, the prospect of French intervention seemed to alter the 
political calculus which drove the planning figures in the first place. As a result, 
UNREO's 1.5 million figure was not widely disseminated among the humanitarian 
community, and certainly did not reach INGOs in any official way. 
Simultaneous with this process, UNHCR began a separate planning and mapping process, 
which adopted the figure of 50,000 as the planning figure for the Goma area. According 
to various sources, this figure was not intended so much as a estimate of the expected 
influx as a politically derived figure calculated to be high enough to generate pre-
planning and interest, low enough not to frighten away Zairian cooperation, which was 
necessary for pre-planning and might well be have been lost by the adoption of the 
somewhat staggering 1.5 million figure. Whatever the rationale - which is not in the 
remit of this report to evaluate - the fact is that the figure of 50,000 refugees for Goma 
was the figure used internally by the UNHCR and disseminated, at least orally, to INGOs 
seeking guidance in their own pre-planning. 
2.2.2.b- INGO's own mapping experience 
For the most part, INGOs did not participate in the planning exercises either of UNREO 
or the UNHCR, although they were informed of its results in a desultory way. In itself, 
this seems a waste of resources and information. INGOs were conducting their own 
mapping and intelligence exercises, and these could usefully have been added into the 
mix of information generated by the UN system. In the end, INGOs mapping exercises 
were no more successful than those of the UN, but reconstructing the exercise as far as 
is possible, it would appear that the INGOs' exercises were ineffective because of the 
UN system. A pattern emerges in exploring INGO mapping, which is that those 
responsible for the mapping do a reasonably good job at identifying the broad features of 
the developing and moving crisis, and then that identification gets lost somewhere inside 
the INGOs' own planning system as other people within the INGO respond to official 
figures from the UN system. 
CARE Canada is a case in point. Executive Director John Watson led a reconnaissance 
mission to the region at the end of May, 1994, and sent a prescient report to CARE 
Kenya, which was leading CARE Canada's operations in the region. Watson argued that 
"we are facing a major crisis as the RPF c!U'ries its offensive from east to west ... ", and 
noted that the displaced population in the southwest was three times what it was in RPF 
zone. The numbers, he argued, "speak for themselves" and "let no one be surprised if we 
see large movements into Zaire" in the upcoming months. Shortly thereafter, with the 
encoumgement of UNHCR, they requested funds from the agency to preposition 
supplies in Goma, a request to which UNHCR did not respond. 
It appears to be at this time that Watson's original assessment of the likely 
development of the emergency was lost in CARE Canada's own planning system. A 
contingency plan for intervention in Goma, dated June 13th 1994, called for 
prepamtions for 60,000 refugees, while noting that the real figure could be between 
"50,000 and 100,000", a figure based on discussions with the UNHCR office in Goma. 
Watson's early estimate, which was lower than but in the same range of scale as 
UNREO's, would have been a far more appropriate planning figure. As an organisation, 
however, CARE had little option but to buy into UNHCR's figure, for it was to UNHCR 
itself that CARE had to tum for financial support in budgeting and planning. 
Other INGOs had similar experiences. MSF pre-stocked medical supplies in Goma, but 
within 24 hours of the influx had to send for further supplies, having significantly 
underestimated the numbers and needs. OXF AM had also propositioned supplies, based 
on their own mapping and intelligence efforts. OXF AM actually already had a sub-office 
in Goma, dating back to before the genocide, and had increased the capacity of that sub-
office to handle a displaced persons crisis in north Kivu, in October 1993, and again to 
deal with Tutsi refugees fleeing the genocide in May and June. From that point on, 
OXF AM stocked additional supplies in Goma, fearing a increase in the case load. Late in 
the game, reconnaissance trips by members of their Emergencies Management Team 
had also identified 500,000 IDPs on the move in the region, still an underestimate but 
again significantly more realistic than the 50,000 figure. However, that intelligence did 
not make it to the key personnel in Goma: days before the influx, OXFAM's water 
engineer in Goma was pulled out of Zaire, leaving them with supplies but no appropriate 
personneL OXF AM was able quickly to recover from what in the end was only a hiccup, 
but it did delay their initial response to the influx. 
Looked at as a whole, the mapping and contingency planning exercise for Goma was a 
mess. INGOs role in that mess was a relatively small one. Excluded from formal 
contingency planning processes, their own estimates did not lead to independent action 
because of the need to operate through the very UN agencies whose flawed planning 
processes were the source of the initial problem. 
What is also notable about both INGO and UN mapping exercises is that the issue of the 
FAR and the extremist militias crossing into Zaire with the refugees was given much 
attention. This is not to say that no one was aware of the issue, rather than nothing in 
the pre-planning process for Goma gave any consideration to the political and security 
problems that would be posed the presence of large numbers of soldiers among the 
refugee population. The implications of this can be seen below in the third episode 
examined. 
On the 8th of July, French army helicopters in western Rwanda confirmed large scale 
population movements. An UNREO report distributed among UN agencies and some 
INGOs - but by no means all the INGOs involved in relief operations - stated that 
"unless immediate action [is taken], humanitarian situation might become a major 
disaster in the very near future. Food, medical assistance, shelter, etc, are urgently 
needed." This was a significant understatement. 
2.2.3 THE FIRST CRITICAL DAYS IN GOMA 
Limited pre-planning left humanitarian agencies scrambling to respond when the 
refugees arrived. Some camp sites had been identified, but these were wholly insufficient 
for the number of people now facing imminent disaster if water and food supplies, and 
health services, were not immediately available. Even those INGOs who had pre-
positioned supplies and personnel in Goma were drastically under-supplied when faced 
with the reality of the scale of the influx. The scramble for Goma was on. 
On July 14th, both the International Medical Corps (IMC) and CARE Canada received 
large grants to begin emergency services. IMC received $700,000 from the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) to provide emergency medical services. 
CARE's grant was actually from a proposal drawn up before the influx; in light of the 
changed realities, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the donor, 
quickly responded to CARE's request to shift the funding into emergency response to 
the influx. On July 15th, when the refugee population in Goma reached I million, the 
ICRC and WPF exchanged a series of faxes which launched an airlift of 1500 tonnes of 
food from Nairobi to Goma, and WFP drew on a UN Central Emergency Revolving 
Fund (CERF) loan of $5 million to purchase more stocks. On the same day, MSF -
which already had a some communications capacity set up in Goma - sent a Situation 
Report (SitRep) to Brussels which approved a plan for Goma operations the same day, 
giving MSF(H) the coordinating role among the various MSF country branches. The 
speed of MSF's response is recalled with a mixture of admiration and envy· by other 
INGOs: by the next day, an MSF logistician and two doctors arrived in Goma to open a 
medical dispensary. 
The next days were crucial. A team of CARE experts arrived from Ottawa; MSF opened 
its second dispensary at Monigi, just out of Goma; a WFP rapid response team was 
deployed in Goma, and the agency began reallocating food stocks from other regional 
programs to start meeting Goma's needs; UNICEF reached operational status and began 
opening special camps for unaccompanied children; and then on July 19th, the Rwanda-
Zaire border closed. On July 20th, with the influx now presumably over, given the closed 
border, key decisions were made as to the distribution of responsibilities. The 
management of three major camps was decided by UNHCR, giving CARE responsibility 
for Katale camp; the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) the lead in Kibumba; and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
co-responsibility with the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) for Mugunga 
camp, which would tum out to be the camp where most of the soldiers and militia 
members who had implemented the genocide would go to seek refuge. By July 21st, 
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) had provided funds for a US 
army airlift of ICRC emergency supplies - Volvo trucks and trailers as well as medical 
supplies. By the end of that same day, key tasks had been assigned to the INGOs who 
were first on the scene. In Katale camp, CARE's management function also saw them 
building the camp infrastructure; OXF AM was tasked to cope with the water situation; 
MSF was assigned to health, and on sanitation MSF and UNICEF were to work together. 
In Kibumba, the IFRC took responsibility for building the camp and distributing food, 
while CARE here provided management and distribution of non-food items; · OXF AM 
was again on water, MSF on health (and nutrition), and UNICEF on sanitation. In 
Mugunga, MdM provided emergency health services and IFRC was on camp 
management, while the other agencies played the same roles. Just as vital as operations 
in the camps were the operations which 'fed' them: the channeling of refugees from 
Goma to the camps, which was done in a cooperative effort by IOM, GOAL, and the 
local Zairian Boy Scouts; central stock management (in warehouses being established in 
Goma town), which fell to CARE; and transport, which CARE shared with WFP. 
A final, critical, responsibility fell to Caritas, which received support from the French 
Army. This was collecting and burying the bodies which by now were littering Goma 
town and the roads to the camps. One person recalled doing a quick head count on the 
56 kilometre drive between Goma and Katale, and estimating the number of bodies at 
over 5,000. Ralph Hazelton, who was sent in by CARE Canada to launch and -manage 
their Zaire operations, remembers that bodies were often simply left on the road where 
they had fallen, and so densely crowded were the roadsides that there was no choice but 
simply to run over the dead bodies. Some of these bodies were eventually rolled up into 
makeshift shrouds by other refugees, and left in a heap by the side of the road. If INGO 
and UN staff were going to be able to start providing supplies in camps along the roads 
which led out of Goma, the bodies had to be cleared away and buried. Other INGOs, 
including OXF AM, participated in this task at various points. 
The division of responsibilities was complicated by the number of INGOs - many of 
them organisations with no previous experience in relief operations - that began 
flooding into Goma shortly after the influx. At the height of the Goma operations, this 
number would peak around 250. Attempting to contact some of these organisations one 
year later, many were found not to have any address or known contact point, still more 
no longer were in existence. 18 Here was a second instance when the weak 
administration that characterises eastern Zaire played an important role. Under normal 
circumstances, INGOs responding to an emergency inside a country are required to 
register with that country's government, which controls the number of agencies 
l8This was the experience of JEval Study III's efforts to collect financial data on NGO activities in 
Goma. See JEval, III,--. 
involved and monitors their access, at least to a certain extent. This was not the case in 
Zaire. Whether INGOs were able to gain access to Zaire by paying off Kinshasa 
authorities or whether simply no controls were put on this flood of INGOs, is not clear. 
What is clear is that responding to the humanitarian consequences of one state collapse 
from inside another had its challenges! 
2.2.3.i- BUILDING A PIPELINE FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES 
The sense of chaotic urgency was not confined to Goma. In Nairobi, where many INGOs 
had regional offices or quickly established them, and in various western headquarters, 
regional directors, emergency support unit leaders, country directors and logistics 
coordinators were also scrambling to open a pipeline of people and supplies to meet the 
extraordinary needs. Running these pipelines often fell to country directors in adjacent 
countries, principally Kenya. Clea O'Reilly, for example, was in Kenya managing 
CONCERN's development programs as well as their programs for Somali refugees in 
north Kenya. That program was just beginning to wind down, and ECHO had agreed to 
fly CONCERN's supplies to a temporary stockpile in Nairobi. By happy coincidence, 
then, CONCERN had a ready supply of rub haul tents, OXF AM feeding kits, solar lamps, 
and high-energy biscuits. After quickly flying to Goma to assess the needs, O'Reilly 
immediately began to use her network of contacts, developed through nine years in the 
region, to open the pipeline. She began by negotiating flight clearances from UNHCR 
Geneva, which had established a flight control centre to manage the flotilla of planes 
which were beginning to arrive at Goma airport. The airport was already over capacity, 
as it was being used by the French army as their base for Operation Turquoise.l9 
Keeping a continual supply of personnel, US cash, and supplies flowing into Goma was a 
seven day a week, twenty hour a day job for CONCERN's Nairobi office. 
Having a base of supplies and capacity in the region proved critical for other 
organisations as well. CARE Kenya was able to draw on its Kenya programs to supply a 
flow of capable personnel to their Goma operations. CARE Kenya was running a large 
refugee management program in northern Kenya, on the Somali border, and began 
pulling people off of this project to send to Goma. Having a reservoir of experienced 
Kenyans made all the difference to CARE's capacity to respond in a timely way to the 
Goma influx. 
For all INGOs, a key problem was how to pay for supplies, accommodation, and local 
staff in Zaire. Getting enough foreign currency into Zaire was a big problem. The 
condition of Zairian state authority was such that there was no proper system for 
international banking or currency transfers in Goma. Most INGOs had to resort to 
sending large amounts of US cash into Goma with their personnel. Mindful of the UN's 
experience in Somalia, wherethey had worked, CONCERN ensured that one of the first 
items sent into Goma was a large safe! (This was not always adequate protection - one 
INGO had their entire safe stolen out of a camp in Bukavu.) Sneaking large amounts of 
cash past the Zairian customs authorities caused many an INGO worker to break out 
into a cold sweat, and on occasion some of this cash was stolen. For the most part, 
however, this system worked without cost, other than to the nerves of INGO personnel. 
A second problem was finding qualified staff. All the major INGOs had already drawn on 
their core emergency teams and reserve lists to respond in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, 
and inside Rwanda itself. Now the net had to be cast wider. This has two deleterious 
implications. First was the need to drain staff away from development projects in other 
parts of the world, which had long-term negative consequences for those projects still 
very much being felt today~ Second was in some instances the necessity of hiring less 
than fully qualified staff. This problem was made more or less difficult by two factors. 
One was size: the larger INGOs simply had wider contacts, more established profiles, and 
l9ovemight, local authorities in Goma had raised landing fees at the airport from $800 to $2500. 
better recruiting systems, and were more quickly able to identity appropriate, even if 
inexperienced personnel, than were smaller or less established INGOs. Second was 
specialisation: those INGOs which concentrated on sharply defined technical areas 
which had commercial counterparts - such as medicine, communications, or water 
engineering - were able to draw on qualified private sector personnel, even if many of 
these had no experience in humanitarian work. 
2.2.3.ii DECIDING TO GO TO GOMA 
For some agencies, it was not immediately obvious that they should go to Goma. A case 
in point is Save the Children Fund (SCF) U.K. At their office in Nairobi, the regional 
director Robert ffolkes examined the situation and concluded that SCF should not form 
part of the Goma response. In ffolkes' assessment, SCF had no spare emergency 
capacity, after having responded to Ngara and other aspects of the crisis; it had no 
francophone staff on whom to draw, nor even a mechanism for recruiting new 
francophones; and the number of other INGOs racing to Goma was such that arguably 
SCF's contribution was unnecessary. The pressures to go were enormous: not only was 
their the scale of the humanitarian need, there was the public relations pressure to be 
seen to be doing something in this huge crisis, and the potential organisational rewards 
of being involved in a high profile emergency. ffolkes resisted these pressures, and SCF's 
London headquarters backed his recommendation. 
It was an unpopular decision. A number of SCF employees - including David Shearer who 
would later head SCF's response inside Rwanda- felt then and feel now that SCF should 
have been in Goma. The reasons are two: there is, of course, the basic humanitarian 
reason that the needs were high and SCF could have made a contribution; the second is 
that the organisational rewards, in profile and money, to organisations who did respond, 
were so high that SCF was perceived to be foolish to miss out on them. 
ffolkes was not the only regional director to have doubts about going. Jude Rand, who 
became CARE's regional support person to the Kenya CD, and de facto regional leader, 
expressed misgivings about CARE's capacity to respond to Goma. As had other 
agencies, CARE had already fielded staff and resources to RPF held Rwanda; to the 
Ngara region; to Burundi; and to Zone Turquoise. Did CARE still have extra capacity to 
cope with Goma? Rand's concerns were balanced in three ways: first, by the belief that 
the scale of humanitarian need dictated that CARE should be involved; second.:~. by an 
assessment that French was not essential for all staff; and fmally by a determination 
that if CARE launched programs in Goma, donors would find the resources to support 
them. 
2.2.3 .iii CHOLERA 
By July 24th - a mere ten days after the first refugees crossed the border - the major 
INGOs, UN agencies, and systems were in place. Nevertheless, the situation remained 
desperate. On July 22nd, a UNICEF Situation Report stated that "hospitals are over 
capacity so most people are just dying where they've established a bit of space." 
In some sectors, particularly water, the situation was somewhat better. At Katale camp, 
for example, OXF AM had quickly established a water system using the good natural 
water supply of the site. The site had a river flowing into it from a nearby volcano, but 
most of the water disappeared into the porous lava rock. According to OXF AM's water 
specialist for the camp, it was a reasonably straightforward task to redirect the water 
200 metres into OXFAM tanks designed for the purpose, chlorinate it (it was already 
clean, having been thoroughly filtered by the lava) and siphon it into taps. The water 
collection point was then fenced off to ·avoid pollution. Within three days, this system 
was providing the refugees with three litres per person per day, enough to meet 
minimum survival needs. By their own, and by external assessment, OXFAM's water 
delivery was superb, far more efficient than that supplied by the US Army in Goma 
(JEval,III,--), which brought in equipment which produced mineral water quality water, 
but for a very limited number of people. 
That the water situation was dealt with quickly proved a blessing, when by mid July the 
situation took a sharp tum for the worse again with the outbreak of a cholera epidemic. 
The first case of cholera was reported on July 17th, and MSF quickly established cholera 
treatment centres. Five days later, the number of reported cases was in the thousands, 
and the situation looked critical. The Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and 
GOAL began increasing efforts to provide adequate water, which was in less supply in 
Kibumba particularly than in Katale or in Goma town itself. The UNHCR asked MSF to 
take control of the water situation in Kibumba, and the agency decided, until OXF AM 
could install large capacity systems, to truck water along the Goma-Kibumba road which 
was still dense with moving refugees. 
Kibumba was arguably the worst of the selected sites, covered as it was in hard volcanic 
rock and lacking a natural source of water (on UNHCR's site identification, see JEval, 
III,xx). One INGO worker described seeing it frrst on July 20th, with roughly 100 
shelters; four days later it had grown to 7km by 3km, and every inch of space was 
covered by shelters. The closest water source was 25km up the road, and each family 
was sending their strongest member there each day to fetch water. Often these did not 
return, and even when they did, the amount of water they could carry was barely 
adequate for the needs of a family. 
The assessment of the Humanitarian Aid study of the Joint Evaluation is that the spread 
of cholera in Goma could have been slowed - and thus the morbidity rate lowered - by 
better pre-planning in Goma (JEval, III, 75.) This report can add nothing to that careful 
and comprehensive assessment, based as it was on a huge volume of data collected from 
UN agencies, INGOs, and independent medical resource centres such as the Centre for 
Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta. What is worth highlighting, though, the cholera 
epidemic more than the influx itself sparked a flood of INGOs to the camps which did 
not help the situation. Notorious cases such as CARE-Germany flying doctors in on a 
two week rotational basis are only part of the story. Stories abound of inexperienced 
INGO personnel incorrectly treating cholera victims, as well as of well-meaning and 
eager, but under qualified INGOs shipping in inappropriate supplies which other INGOs 
were burdened with managing. The flood of unknown and inexperienced INGOs to the 
emergency, with its attendant problems, may be an issue INGOs themselves have_to find 
some way to regulate to forestall a tarnishing of images of professional INGOs operating 
according to high standards. 
2.2.4 Distribution & Registration 
Once the cholera epidemic had been contained, attention turned to the proper 
organisation of the camps, distribution of food and non-food aid, and provision of 
appropriate social services. In a conventional refugee situation (if there is such a thing), 
a central aspect of solidifying these systems would be to conduct a registration exercise 
to determine precise numbers in the camps and map out the beneficiary population and 
their needs (including identifying unattached women, unaccompanied children, the 
number of elderly, the gender divide, etc). One of the things that this allows relief 
agencies to do, as well, is organise a proper system of distribution according to the needs 
of the most vulnerable. 
There are many potential such systems, but the evolution of INGO best practice has 
determined that where possible, existing political structures should be used to organise 
distribution. This has a number of advantages, including supporting existing cultural 
values and political systems among an otherwise dislocated population, and a degree of 
efficiency which stems from the political structures inherent knowledge of the 
beneficiary population. Organising alternative distribution systems, it is argued, simply 
attempts to replicate a system of knowledge and organisation which already exists. In 
Somalia and elsewhere, UNHCR, WFP, and INGOs involved in camp management such 
as CARE and CONCERN, has developed this best practice to a high degree. 
When the Rwandan refugees fled into Goma in their masses (and Bukavu and elsewhere 
as well), there was, in the estimation of both INGO and UN workers on the ground, 
neither time nor resources to conduct any sort of registration process. Where it was 
attempted, it proved very difficult. The following excerpt from Mark Richardon's diary, 
taken from a day at Hongo camp, south of Goma, is illustrative: 
CARE had been told not to register any refugees until UNHCR told us to do so, 
but we began anyway at noon because the 5000 people there were restless. It 
went so slowly that soon everyone grew fed up and began jumping and pushing 
through the string. People were pushing and pressing everywhere, overrunning 
our tables and ready to take our 1400 plastic sheets. Personally, I was calm and 
not in the least scared because I figured the worst that could happen was they 
would overrun us, we'd evacuate our dozen people in trucks, and they'd take all 
the plastic sheeting. In hindsight, I think that was naive, and I believe now they 
would have beaten us or even killed us given the opportunity. Later, I learned 
one man had taken a grenade from his pocket, ready to throw, but been 
persuaded by his friends to put it back. My God! We were about ready to flee out 
of there when Chris [Alwood, of CARE Canada] jumped on a table and, 
screaming in French, told the crowd we would deal only through the heads of the 
prefectures. The crowd settled, 11 chiefs turned up, and Chris went off up the 
hill for a very public huddle. It was eventually agreed that we would distribute an 
equal number of plastic sheets to each prefecture, through their chiefs. This 
worked very well. 
What a country! What a life!" 
This experience was repeated throughout the Goma region. With no chance to conduct 
registration exercises, humanitarian workers relied on existing political systems to 
distribute relief supplies. The implications of doing so would soon become clear, and are 
explored in the next 'episode.' 
2.2.5 ADDITIONAL ISSUES IN GOMA 
A few more points should be made about the Goma influx before moving on.:.. These 
points share the common theme that they are either unconventional features of a 
refugee emergency response which were present in high measure in Goma, or features 
which while not unconventional in historical terms nevertheless fall outside of INGOs' 
standard conception of what they do and who they do it for. 
2.2.5.a - Military Humanitarians 
The first was the presence of a large number of 'military humanitarians', as they 
became known. In Goma, during the first months of the crisis, no less than four 
different western armies deployed troops to support humanitarian operations. Operation 
Turquoise focused its efforts inside southwest Rwanda (Zone Turquoise), but also 
frequently lent what spare capacity it had to INGO and UN efforts to cope with Goma. 
Shortly after the influx, the United States sent a large contingent of soldiers, comprising 
Operation Support Hope, to assist in the delivery of relief supplies. Smaller contingents 
were sent by the Dutch, the Israelis, and the Irish, though the Irish army deployed its 
troops not as a military unit but as staff support for INGOs. The Japanese sent a small 
contingent to Goma from October to December. Relations between INGOs and military 
personnel were often difficult. INGO personnel working in the water sector in particular 
voiced their frustration with Operation Support Hope, which according to them was 
slower and more cumbersome in delivering essentially similar - and sometimes less 
appropriate and more expensive - relief services than the INGOs themselves were 
capable of providing. In particular, the US military's insistence on keeping all its heavy 
equipment at base headquarters every night - which involved moving the equipment up 
and down the slow road between Goma and the camps, with an armed escort - drove 
INGO personnel to distraction, given that they were operating in the same conditions 
but without security. Irish INGOs also report problematic relations with the Irish army 
personnel sent out to support their operations, and one senior Irish INGO worker 
admitted that given the choice they would not suggest a repeat performance of the 
attempt at cooperation. On the other hand, the military contingents provided a level of 
organisational capacity which was far beyond that of the average INGO; were able to 
deploy heavy machinery that INGOs could not get into the region; and undertook a 
number of tasks which some INGOs refused to accept - notably, the French army did 
much of the work of clearing corpses after the cholera epidemic. An UNREO officer 
wrote to a colleague to say that the presence of the French army in Goma "has saved 
uncountable numbers of lives. Whatever capacity the UN had here when all hell broke 
loose was definitely inadequate, and if it were not for the French ... " 
2.2.5.b - Trauma 
The second feature of the Goma influx which stands out was the extraordinarily high 
degree of trauma, among the refugee population and among relief workers - indeed, 
among anyone and everyone involved in coping with or responding to the genocide in 
any fashion. Clearly, all refugee situations are traumatic: the experiencing of being 
forced to flee a home, especially from the threat or fear of violence, is surely among 
the most traumatic a person can experience. In the Rwanda case, however, this level of 
trauma was enormously magnified by the scale of the trauma from which the refugees 
were fleeing. Of course, Hutu refugees in Zaire were not for the most part victims of 
genocidal attacks. But genocide is not a question simply of a large number of individual 
attacks strong together: it is a form of extraordinary social convulsion in which the 
leadership of a society as a whole attempts to wipe out a population which, until the 
genocide begins, is not an enemy or a foreigner, but a part of the society itself. As 
Randolph Kent, former head of UNREO, and others have argued, the ultimate victim of 
a genocide is society itself. Among the refugees in Goma, quite apart from those who 
participated in the killing program, were either chose or were forced to support the 
genocide, by identifying neighbours, providing names to militias, providing material to 
the army, and other means. Even among those who had not participated in the genocide 
in any direct sense, there was a profound sense of fear and guilt: if genocide is an attack 
not an individuals but on a social group, then the guilt for conducting the genocjde can 
easily be placed on the social group from which come the leaders of the genocide. The 
guilt or innocence of individual persons in the refugee camp is a juridical question 
beyond the competence of this report, but it is unquestionably the case that the vast 
majority of the refugees in Goma were profoundly traumatised by the experience. 
That level of trauma is transmitted beyond the immediate participants in the event. 
The vast majority of diplomats, UN personnel, journalists and INGO staff who came in 
contact with genocide in any but the most cursory form suffered from a degree of 
trauma, in some cases from acute trauma. Seasoned aid workers who had lived through 
Somalia, Iraq, Sudan and other emergencies without failing to cope, broke down in the 
face of the level of misery in Goma painted as it was against the backdrop of the 
extraordinary atrocity of the genocide. Charles Petrie (UNREO) talked about the crisis 
as "madness, more than madness, worse than bestial perversion"; CARE Canada's Ralph 
Hazelton recalls spending the first few days in Goma simply reacting to the situation and 
then, from a balcony overlooking Goma, crying uncontrollably at the. passively savage 
degradation of human life. Two years after the fact, every aid worker interviewed for 
this report had stories they still could still feel the effects of the crisis on their own 
lives: many spent a number of months following their involvement in some form of 
psychological healing process; a large number became alienated from families; all have 
stories they still cannot bring themselves to tell. 
The trauma had a direct impact on INGO operations. First, many INGO personnel who 
were inside Rwanda at the time of the start of the genocide - and who might, in other 
circumstances, have been expected to join emergency teams in Goma and elsewhere -
were so deeply traumatised by what they saw, what they were unable to stop from 
happening to friends and colleagues and the society in which they worked, that they 
were unable to provide any reliable input into their own agencies' planning for the 
subsequent stages of response. Second, staff in the field were put under extraordinary 
strain by the combination of the trauma and the normally exorbitant working 
conditions of emergency operations. The scale of the crisis drove many to work well 
beyond their own physical capacity, to the point that at one stage in early August a 
WFP employee tasked with organising transportation for personnel complained that he 
was overburdened by medical evacuations of UN and INGO staffers. More to the point, a 
number of INGO head office staff admitted that at various stages they had to question, 
and in some instances reject, the judgment of even experienced field staff who appeared 
to have lost perspective among the scale of the tragedy. 
INGOs did make some efforts to deal with the situation. A number of INGOs sent 
trauma counselors or psychiatrists to the field to assess the stability of their staff, or 
help them cope with the situation. For the most part this was not successful. A form of 
aid workers' machismo emerged, and along with it a deeply black humour - both 
probably critical defense mechanisms under the circumstances. Most INGO workers were 
dismissive of the efforts of psychiatrists or trauma counselors to assess the impact of 
what they taunted were far worse conditions than the psychiatrists had ever coped with 
(though that is hardly the point.) CONCERN's staff in Goma were put off by the whole 
idea, played games with a counselor sent out from Dublin: at a counseling session, each 
staff member present one by one pulled out a knife and stroked the blade with their 
thumbs, seemingly oblivious to what they were doing. The counselor left shortly 
thereafter. More successful were counselors who simply talked to team leaders or 
regional coordinators and gave them tools for identifying when their own staff members 
were displaying signs of no longer coping adequately. 
2.2.5.c. - The press 
The counsellors were outnumbered by journalists. With the influx into Goma, and in 
particular with the outbreak of cholera, newspaper and television news cameras flooded 
into the already overcrowded facilities of Goma. Some mention has been made_already 
of the symbiotic relationship which emerged between journalists and the press officers 
INGOs designated to deal with them. Like all symbiotic partnerships, the relationship 
was simultaneously close and draining. Many journalists camped out on the floors of the 
already cramped quarters of INGO staff, and shared everything from rides to evening 
meals. Yet journalists and INGOs were in some senses on opposing sides of the story, 
with press officers feeling that journalists were only trying to cover the most 
sensational aspects of the story, white journalists would complain that the press officers 
were shielding aspects of what was going on. Mark Richardson, CARE Canada's press 
officer in Goma, described his job as that of a 'jackal herder." 
2.2.5.d -Presence of soldier and militia members among the refugees 
Finally, and most importantly, a striking feature of the situation in Goma was the large 
number of former FAR soldiers and militia members among the refugee population. 
These henchmen of the genocide had, as noted above, been allowed into Zaire by a 
combination low capacity and willful neglect. A further problem were Zairian soldiers 
from the Goma region, ostensibly deployed to provide security for the refugee camps, in 
fact amplifying the generalised chaos of the initial stages, and for a considerable time 
adding to the security problems in the camps by harassing, robbing, and occasionally 
beating refugees. 
Rwandan soldiers and militia members were admitted to refugee camps without 
discrimination by UN agencies and INGOs. Although eventually a large percentage of 
the ex-FAR among the refugees separated themselves out from the general population 
and encamped themselves in Mugunga, some 40 kilometres west of Goma, many stayed 
mixed in with the general refugee population as did nearly all militia members. As 
combatants, these men (and some women) were not legitimate refugees, and had no 
entitlement to aid or relief supplies. Nevertheless, they received it, both directly and 
indirectly. Indirectly by melting into the general population - easy enough if you're a 
militia member, with no uniform and only a machete as a weapon - and then diverting 
the delivery of relief supplies through a process of intimidation of other refugees within 
the camps. They also received relief supplies directly, however: Caritas and Lutheran 
World Federation (L WF), among other agencies, directly supplied Mugunga camp -
comprised almost entirely of soldiers - with emergency relief supplies. This aid was 
given on the basis of the argument that if the soldiers were not given a share of the 
supplies, they would simply steal the supplies from deserving refugees. This was no doubt 
the case, as even when they were being supplied theft and diversion of other relief 
supplies occurred frequently. 
Clearly, combatants - and in particular people who had implemented a genocide - should 
never have received either relief supplies or the protection of international law and the 
UN that comes with being treated as a de facto refugee. That it occurred has had a 
tremendously negative impact on the long-term, ongoing Rwandan conflict. Relief 
supplies given to or siphoned off by the soldiers, militias, and leadership of the former 
regime were quickly put into rehabilitating the rump of the Habyarimana regime, and in 
particular their armed capacity. 
The question is, however, what options were open to INGOs. Ideally, Zaire should have 
disarmed the FAR and the militias as they crossed the border. Failing that, Zaire should 
at least have provided sufficient security to the refugee camps such that INGOs would 
not have to have supplied Mugunga camp out of fear of raiding. Zaire did neither. In the 
circumstances, it is hard to see how INGOs could have separated the combatants from 
the broader population, or screened refugees, either effectively or safely. The people in 
question had more than proved their willingness and capacity to kill in huge numbers if 
their political aims were thwarted or even challenged. The presumption must be that 
any effective effort by the humanitarian community to screen their access to aid supplies 
would have been met with violent resistance - as indeed it was on a number of small 
occasions. To have attempted to engage in a screening process without military "backing 
would have been extremely risky, not just for INGOs but for the refugees themselves. In 
the event, INGOs did not try, but instead adopted the pose of neutral humanitarianism 
which has long been their modus vivendi, and supplied relief to all present, irrespective 
of combatant status. The operational and political implications of all of this form the 
subject of the next episode. 
2.3 - POLITICS AND WAR IN KA TALE CAMP: REFUGEES RESPOND TO THE 
INGOS 
Concentrating on the technical aspects of relief delivery in the initial months in Goma 
paid its reward in a relatively quick stabilization of the delivery system in the camps. 
Once the immediate needs were met, however, disturbing political realities came to the 
fore and the security situation rapidly deteriorated. INGOs realized that they were facing 
a situation in which the remnants of the Habyarimana regime were controlling delivery 
of relief supplies inside the camps, and diverting a large share of those supplies to 
rebuilding themselves as an armed force. Having responded to the refugee influx in a 
mode developed through the paradigm of neutral humanitarianism, INGOs found 
themselves in the decidedly non-neutral position of facilitating a renewal of the 
genocidal regime. Their efforts to respond politically to the situation succeeded in 
raising public awareness of the dilemmas which they faced, but were ineffective in terms 
of their contribution to ongoing negotiations within the UN system on how to tackle 
the problems the INGOs were facing. A failure to coordinate their efforts with those of 
the UNHCR and the UN Secretariat squandered what was otherwise a principled and 
potentially effective coordinated response in October and November of 1994. 
2.3.1 THE SECURITY SITUATION 
After the initial chaotic month, the situation in Goma appeared to have stabilized 
somewhat. The end of the cholera outbreak (roughly in the middle of August) saw a 
decline in morbidity and mortality rates (JEval, III, ). The movement of refugees from 
Rwanda and between camps was reduced to a small flow. Most of the refugees who would 
come to Goma were there, and were placed in camps with access to basic food, health, 
and water provisions. 
Through August, September and October, the essential humanitarian tasks of identifYing 
resources, building a pipeline to transport those resources to the beneficiaries, and 
distributing the resources - food, water, health supplies and medical treatment, social 
services - within the beneficiary population, were at the level of contained crisis, as 
distinct from the earlier pandemonium. However, with the departure of both the US and 
French troops, the security situation in the refugee camps and in the region in general 
began to deteriorate. The situation was already bad before the American and French 
troops left. The following discursive account of one months worth of serious, reported 
security incidents reveals the extent to which even with a number of neutral military 
contingents present, the situation was highly charged. 
• On August 8th, ex-FAR forces killed the Zairian staff of an American missionary in 
Goma. The same day, a refugee shot dead a Zairian soldier who was directing traffic m 
the camps. 
• On August 9th, ex-FAR elements in Kibumba camp beat to death a Rwandan refugee 
who was encouraging others to return to Rwanda. 
• On the 11th, a Zairian soldier killed a Goma money changer, setting of protests in 
Goma town. 
• Two days later, two people suspected of working for the RPF were beaten to death by 
ex-FAR troops in Mugunga camps. 
• On the 16th, a gang of refugees attacked a food distribution post in Kibumba camp and 
threatened staff of the IFRC. Later that day, a Zairian soldier attempted to steal a 
refugee's car, and in the ensuing shuffle Zairian forces opened fire on the camp, killing 2 
and injuring 4 others. 
• Local volunteers of ADRA were severely beaten during an ADRA-Caritas food 
distribution exercise on the 17th, and the same day, further hampering the process of 
controlled distribution, ex-FAR forces stole ID bracelets from the HCR's registration 
pack. 
• On August 18th, an expatriate staffer of the CDC was ambushed by 6 Zairian soldiers 
on his way home from a camp, where earlier on two refugees had been killed in a 
disagreement over food distribution. 
• On August 22nd, two INGOs - MdM/F and MdM/Sp - had their vehicles stolen and 
chauffeurs beaten by ex-FAR men in Mugunga camp. 
• A voluntary repatriation exercise attempted by the UNHCR on August 24th was 
violently disrupted by suspected Interahamwe militia youth with the support of local 
Zairian forces; one Rwandan was savagely beaten, and the Interahamwe also attacked 
clearly marked UN vehicles. 
• On the 26th, UNHCR had to call on support from a locally deployed Israeli army 
company (sent to Goma to provide support to emergency medical operations), when 
stones were thrown into a CARE staff house. The same evening, a UNHCR car was 
stopped by six masked Zairian soldiers, and its occupants harassed. 
• On the 27th, refugees in Kituko were murdered after encouraging others to repatriate, 
and the Dutch INGO Memina had their radios stolen from their compound. 
• On the 28th, in Kitko camp, a man suspected of being affiliated to the RPF was set 
upon by a crowd and beaten to death. 
• The 29th saw two MSF workers robbed by masked men carrying a grenade, and a 
female refugee hacked to death by a mob who overheard her telling other refugees that 
the conditions for repatriation in Rwanda were good. 
• The month ended with the Zairian soldiers - who had been hired to provide security at 
the airport - looting the US camp after the last troops departed from the airport.20 
Though they had clearly done little to directly control the level of violence in the 
camps and the region, it does appear that the presence of the American and particularly 
French armies on the ground diminished somewhat the capacity of the rump of the 
Habyarimana regime to use the refugee camps as a staging ground for its own 
rehabilitation. With the departure of the armies, however, the process got well 
underway. The security situation continued to unravel. The following, taken from a 
USAID report on the situation dated September 4th, conveys the essence: 
Security in Goma town and the refugee camps has significantly deteriorated 
during the past month to the point that some INGOs are reconsidering their 
support of activities in the refugee camps. Several factors contribute to the 
insecurity in Goma and the region, including the general collapse in law and 
order in Zaire; internal Zairian political dissent; the uncertain existing 
relationship between the Zairian and Rwandan government; the increasing 
availability or arms and small weaponry in the region. Within the refugee 
camps, a number of factors contribute to the insecurity, such as the ongoing 
campaign of intimidation aimed at preventing refugees from repatriating; the 
overcrowded, poor camp layout, and a lack of crowd control that is intensified 
by the lack of an evacuation plan; camp mob and gang problems and the lack of 
law and order; and undisciplined and corrupt Zairian military elements. 
When five MdM staffers were held hostage by Zairians on the 7th of October, it seemed 
the situation had bottomed out. It was to get worse. 
2.3 .l.a - FAR and militia control over relief resources. 
As illustrated above, the scale of the influx into Goma had made it impossible to conduct 
any sort of initial registration. The UNHCR and their camp management partnel:§ relied 
on the existing leadership structures to distribute food and non-food aid in the camps. 
The problem with this, of course, was that the existing leaders of the refugee camps 
were the men and women who had justified, planned, and executed the Rwandan 
genocide. 
This leadership group - members of the Habyarimana regime, including many local 
administrators, clerics, and other authorities, plus the defeated forces of the FAR, and 
the members of the extremist militias, especially the Interahamwe - had quite 
deliberately stoked fears of the likelihood of a revenge genocide by the RPF to 
encourage the Hutu population of Rwanda to flee to refugee camps in the face of the 
RPF's advance. They were now using the refugee population as a human shield, both in 
the sense that the refugee movement had blocked the RPF from following them across 
the Zairian border and dealing them a debilitating defeat, and in the sense that the 
refugee camps provided this leadership - which we can refer to in short hand as les 
genocidiares - the ideal setting within which to attempt a rehabilitation of their power. 
This involved both controlling the refugee population, especially to ensure that they did 
not return home, and thus that relief supplies kept flowing to Goma, and diverting those 
20List of incidents compiled from USAID daily situation reports, UNREO (Goma) situation reports, 
and other sources. 
relief supplies in order to rebuild their anned capacity. In both of these aims, the UN 
and INGOs in Goma were unwilling facilitators. 
As documented above, a large number of ex-FAR troops and militias had established a 
separate camp in Mugunga, roughly -- km west of Goma, and the senior leadership of 
the Habyarimana regime, both civilian and military, were concentrated in nearby Lac 
Vert camp. But it was not only in these camps that les genocidiares controlled the 
refugee populations. By September it was increasingly clear that several things were 
happening. First, les genocidiares were able to block any process of voluntary return by 
continued intimidation of refugees, including by beating and murdering anyone who 
voiced a pro-repatriation sentiment. Other, slightly less obvious tactics were used to 
instill fear in the population. Witchhunts, a feature of village life in parts of Rwanda, 
were initiated in the camps by camp leaders, with the apparent aim - and certainly the 
effect - of cowing the refugee population into submissiveness. Second, this leadership 
was for the most part able to control the distribution of food and non-food aid in the 
camps, which meant both that few resources were reaching the most vulnerable, and that 
les genocidiares were siphoning off a substantial portion of the resources, putting them 
into feeding soldiers, and selling food to local Zairians, including Zairian soldiers, and 
using the money to purchase new weapons and other military equipment. One HCR 
officer estimated at one point that les genocidiares were getting anywhere from 30% to 
50% of the total resources being distributed in the camps. By early 1995, intelligence 
sources could confinn UN estimates that a 'new' anny of roughly 50,000 troops had 
reconstituted itself out of the old FAR, and were based in the Goma region (both in the 
camps near Goma, and on Isle ljwa, in Lake Kivu.) 
The control les genocidiares gained over the camps did not happen instantaneously in 
all camps. Looking back it appears that the further away from Lac Vert, the longer it 
took les genocidiares to establish control of a camp. Katale camp was furthest away 
from the exiled regime; the process by which /es genocidiares took control of that 
camp illustrates the intensity of the political battle in which INGOs in Goma were 
caught up and engaged, and the limitations on their capacity to · control such political 
situations. 
2.3.2 EVACUATION FROM KATALE CAMP 
In Katale camp, a very long, difficult 56 kilometres north of Goma town, CARE had 
been given the responsibility of managing what had become the world's largest-refugee 
camp, with an estimated population of 270,000. In part because of the distance of the 
camp away from Goma - which gave agencies a chance to establish some locations and 
systems before the refugees arrived en mass - Katale was among the less chaotic camps 
in the Goma region. The OXF AM water team had managed to get a reasonable water 
supply flowing in the camp in just a few days and CARE had also managed reasonably 
quickly to control the distribution and delivery process. Thus security incidents in 
Katale camp were far fewer than elsewhere. 
There are apparently contradictory reasons for understanding why this was so. What is 
clear is that the CARE team had quickly put into place a sophisticated distribution and 
local management structure, learned from experience in the CARE camps for Somali 
refugees in northern Kenya. CARE had pulled a number of their staff from the Kenya 
camps, and this experience was critical in being able quickly to establish a controlled 
system. The system had two elements: representatives from each of the 11 prefeture 
(Rwandan provincial units) liased with the INGOs to detennine the nature of 
distribution, and in addition separate committees were established to negotiate with the 
INGOs on distribution, social services, women's issues, etc. It is not clear whether the 
prefeture representatives were genocidaires: some CARE staffers from Katale assert 
they were not, while other INGOs insist that at least the majority of them were indeed 
fonner regime people. In either case, however, it seems clear that in the early days, 
CARE's dual system enabled it to have some significant impact on distribution and other 
political issues in the camp. For example, a women's representative on the distribution 
committee brought some problems with women's access to the attention of the 
committee, and changes were made in the distribution process to accommodate the 
problem. There was even a security committee, which raised issues of concern and liased 
both with the camp's INGO management and the Rwandan Boy Scout group which 
CARE had hired to help organise the camp. The Boy Scouts controlled access to the 
camp at its gates, and directed traffic within the camp. Their presence was presumed 
also to have a more general deterrent effect on lawlessness.21 In one case, an incident 
involving Zairian soldiers had resulted in two guns being kept in the camp. CARE's 
camp leader, Guy Banville, halted all distributions until the guns were returned, which 
they were on the following day by a representative on the security committee. 
In the politics of Goma, precisely this degree of control and order - even if it was partial 
- was a major problem for the INGOs involved. Les genocidiares struck back. As 
described by Banville, they launched a coup against the INGOs' controL It is not clear 
whether they had not done so earlier due to lack of capacity - perhaps the leadership 
had concentrated its efforts in the camps closer to Lac Vert and only now, having 
secured their control over those camps were moving into Katale - or because in its 
initial stages, the INGOs management and distribution did not interfere with their goals. 
An strong hypothesis is that both are true: the INGO management of the camp did not 
begin to interfere with les genocidiares goals until the social services and security 
committees, among others, started to have an impact, and by the time it did, the rump 
regime had sufficient control over the camps further south to focus its attention on 
gaining control over relief supplies in Katale camp. Certainly, when they launched their 
'coup', it was well planned, closely coordinated, and highly effective. 
On the afternoon of Wednesday, September --, a representative of the security 
committee reported an increase in banditry in the camp, and stated that the Boy Scouts 
appeared to have lost control of the situation. On the following day, the leader of the 
bandits was found dead in the camp, and the killing blamed on the Boy Scouts. A group 
of militia members among the refugees started roving through the camps looking for 
Boy Scouts, ready for a fight. Some militia members began to threaten expat INGO 
workers. A decision was taken to withdraw to Rutshuru, where most of the INGOs 
working in Katale had their local headquarters and many aid workers had their 
accommodations. The following day, the situation worsened. A 'blacklist' was 
distributed around the camp: a Kenyan CARE employee, who ran the social .services 
committee, was at the top of the list, and CARE's management team were also named. 
CARE's Goma leader, Bob Kelly, determined that the list should be taken seriously, and 
decided to withdraw INGO staff from the camp, and began making preparations to that 
effect. It was obvious in the camp that the INGOs were preparing to leave. At this stage, 
a refugee with whom CARE had collaborated on the management entered the CARE 
office and told Kelly that the INGOs had to leave. When Kelly said that they were 
making preparations to leave, the refugee said he did not understand: men with grenades 
were preparing to make a move on the CARE offices, and they had to leave now. 
The evacuation strategy was already in place, and worked well. The decision had already 
been taken that the exit point would be a road towards the Uganda border some ten 
miles north of Rutshuru. Most of the expat workers, and many local NGO workers, 
evacuated by this route and went to the Uganda border. Here many of them were delayed 
by the lack of Ugandan visas, but this was sorted out quite quickly. After passing through 
Uganda to Rwanda, most were able to return to Goma, and eventually to the camp itself. 
(Not all of CARE's staff were able to return. Banville received a personally addressed 
death threat which was taken seriously by the INGO, and he was evacuated from Zaire.) 
21 It is important to note that the regional Boy Scouts organisation differs from its western 
counterparts in that most of its members are in their thirties. 
The evacuation did not last long, and as a result did not hugely disrupt beneficiary relief 
in the camp. Local staff were left behind, and kept the distribution systems in the camp 
flowing well. Within a week of the initial evacuation, the expatriate staff were able to 
return. When they did so, however, they found that 35 of the Boy Scouts had been 
murdered by les genocidiares within the camp. 
The Boy Scouts were not killed randomly. Rather, the murder of the Boy Scouts was the 
central act in a well coordinated putsch against the INGO leadership of the camp. 
Details of the planning extended to having ensured the absence of three senior Zairian 
police officers who were in theory there to provide the camp with security. The three 
had told CARE they would be absent for the day, when they all had to attend the 
wedding of a friend. When the INGOs evacuated, faster than expected, they saw all three 
loitering beside the road a few miles from the camp. One later admitted they had been 
paid by militia leaders to absent themselves from the camp on the day of the attack. 
Planned, controlled, and successful: when the INGOs returned to Katale, militia members 
with machetes and some guns, and new boots, had replaced the Boy Scouts at the 
entrance to the camp, and the number of identifiable militia members within the camp 
had grown substantially. Though the INGOs who carne back in were allowed to operate, 
to continue to distribute resources, it was clear from this point on that that distribution 
was if not directly controlled by the genocidiares then at least they were able to block 
any sort of distribution which went contrary to their interests. 
Within two weeks, CARE decided that their position in the camp was untenable, and on 
October 17th, announced their intention permanently to withdraw their services from 
the camp. The INGOs in Katale moved to regain control over the politics of Katale. 
2.3.3 WITHDRAWING FROM KATALE 
As the USAID report cited above notes, the issue of withdrawing relief services from the 
camps, in the face of the ethical issue of feeding killers, had been raised within the INGO 
community as early as September. MSF had already pulled out of one camp, citing 
ethical issues, but MSF communications personnel privately will admit that MSF's role 
in the camp was in any case at an end, and that the ethical issue was not the one which 
determined the timing of the withdrawaL22 Among the majority of INGOs, the issue 
had been raised with the UNHCR, but not acted upon. With the coup against the INGOs 
in Katale camp, the issue moved to the front of the agenda. 
With a number of INGOs raising security and ethics question with them, UNHCR decided 
to hold a meeting on the issue, to which roughly 20 INGOs turned up. UNHCR explained 
their perspective: that under international law, they were bound to provide protection 
for the refugees, and that the humanitarian imperative dictated that they stay involved 
in the camps. However, among the INGOs who attended, the issue did not go away, and 
over the next few days a number of them began to discuss the possibility of a 
coordinated response. The idea grew, and a statement was drafted, saying that the INGO 
community would withdraw from the camps if the responsible members of the 
international community failed to act to tackle the security problems, and separate les 
genocidiares from legitimate refugees in the camps. Over five days in late November, a 
core group of INGOs met to negotiate a common text. INGO regional and camp leaders 
faxed draft copies to headquarters in Europe and North America, and a joint strategy 
emerged. 
On the 3rd ofNovember, MSF/B, MSF!F, MSFIH, CARE Canada, CARE Britain, CARE 
USA, CARE Austria, CARE Norway, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the 
American Rescue Committee (ARC), OXF AM/UK and Ireland, MdMIF, the Canadian ---
-------- (CECI), Pharmaciens sans Frontieres Spain (PSF-Spain), and MdM-Spain issued a 
22confidential interview, MSF staff member. 
joint statement declaring that they would be forced to withdraw from the camps unless 
four conditions were met: 
the 'structures within the camps which incite violence' - (ie. les genocidiares ] -
should be separated from legitimate refugees; 
arms should be removed from the camps; 
an independent registration should be carried out with appropriate security 
provisions; 
the protection of refugees should be guaranteed; 
and relief agencies should be guaranteed their freedom to deliver assistance without 
interference from 'current power structures within the camps' - another reference to les 
genocidiares. 
Although it was decided among the signatory INGOs to remove an earlier drafts' explicit 
call for UN military intervention, it was clear from the language of the letter, and from 
its call that "the United Nations and international community take immediate and 
decisive action" that this is what the letter intended and the INGOs were demanding. 
Several other INGOs who were operating in the camp decided not to sign: these included 
CONCERN, Assist UK, LWF, and World Vision. As late as November 1st, draft letters 
stated that GOAL was "keen" to sign, but ultimately they did not. UNHCR early on 
made it clear that it could not be publicly associated with such a letter, but privately did 
much to facilitate the process by which the letter was drafted, and advised the INGO 
press officers on appropriate release strategy. 
2.3.4 IMPACT OF THE WITHDRAWAL. 
The coordinated press release by the INGOs certainly received considerable attention in 
the western media, and brought the issues of the security and ethical situation in Goma 
to light in a way which it had not yet been reported in the press. In terms of 'drawing 
attention' to important aspects of an emergency, this was clearly quite an effective 
tool. However, it is questionable whether the move had any more substantive impact. 
First of all, it is quite clear that the whole process had no impact on the ground in terms 
of altering the delivery of relief assistance to the refugees or· minimising les 
genocidiares control over that process. The INGOs which did withdraw from Katale 
camp were replaced by others: when CARE conveyed to UNHCR its intention to 
withdraw relief services from Katale camp, it was already able to indicate the L WF was 
ready and able to replace them (this communication was roughly 10 days before the 
press statement was issued and the withdrawal became formal.) MSF, as noted above, had 
stated that it had withdrawn for ethical reasons, and no doubt these were real, but some 
within MSF contend that it would have withdrawn at roughly that time anyway as the 
need for emergency medical treatment was much diminished. What is more, those 
INGOs which did withdraw from Katale continued to operate in the Goma region. CARE 
continued to manage camp supplies from a warehouse in Goma: those supplies were 
distributed in Katale camp, as well as elsewhere. The actual impact on relief delivery, or 
the politics surrounding it, was negligible at best. 
Slightly more difficult to judge is the impact of the letter on the broader discussion 
within the international community as to how to tackle the problem. What is clear is 
that there was already an ongoing dialogue between UNHCR, the Secretary General, 
UNAMIR, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) about the security 
problem, the outlines of which were not raised with INGO field staff at their meetings 
with the UNHCR in Goma. As early as mid-August, the UNHCR had suggested to the 
Secretary General and to DPKO that the situation was beyond both their scope and their 
mandate. DPKO began consideration of various alternatives, but UNHCR considered 
them to be somewhat unrealistic. Therefore, they began on their own initiative to 
negotiate with the Government of Zaire as to the provision of an internationally 
directed Zairian security force for the camps. At the end of September, UNHCR took 
this proposal, which had been successfully negotiated, to the Secretary General for his 
support. The UNHCR was in effect told to put the program on ice while DPKO 
explored more robust options. 
A November 18th report by DPKO made clear that the ideal goal was the separation of 
soldiers from refugees, but that this was a difficult goal to achieve. DPKO laid out a 
series of options to the Security Council, the most ambitious of which was designed to 
reach the ideal goal. 
Option A provided by the DPKO was to send a (relatively) large number of troops under 
Chapter VII to separate the soldiers from the refugees and in so doing disarm them. The 
proposal was designed to meet the ideal goal and, significantly, its purpose was to 
enhance the physical protection of refugees by removing the sources of the threat. The 
report estimated that 7,000 troops well-armed troops would be required to fulfill the 
mission, with 4,000 devoted to the North Kivu (Gorna) region and 3,000 for South Kivu 
(Bukavu). According to DPKO sources, the department knew full well that this option 
was a non-starter, that the Security Council would never consider a Chapter VII 
humanitarian operation so close to the disasters of Somalia. They were right: the option 
was dismissed in the Security Council as "a fantasy." 
Option B was considerably more moderate, involving 3-5000 troops under Chapter VI 
in what carne to be dubbed "the salami approach." The idea was to have a smaller 
number of troops secure a small slice of the camps and "clean" it: disarm the soldiers 
and leave behind a protection structure to ensure the safety of refugees after the 
departure of the troops. It was argued that this 'cleaning' process would require 3000 
troops if only North Kivu was dealt with, and 5000 troops if both North and South Kivu 
regions were tackled. This option was clearly the preference of the Secretary General. 
This was based on a clear perception that a Chapter VI operation was easier to handle -
ie. get past the Security Council - than the Chapter VII option, and that the solution it 
invoked required only the formal agreement of Zaire, not their operational 
involvement. It was this option which received further exploration, though it was 
eventually rejected. 
DPKO also put forward a third, highly innovative option: to use a private security 
company to provide the protection required. DPKO received an informal proposal from 
a British company specialising in providing private protection (to homes, firms, etc) 
which outlined a solution involving this firm providing training and logistical support to 
Zaire's troops. The perceived attraction of the option was that it would avoid the 
political difficulty that had scuppered the UNAMIR option - countries not wanting to 
deal with the political repercussions of body-bags returning back from an operation in 
Zaire which their populations little understood. The proposal did receive some support 
in the Security Council, including from one member of the P5, as a practical solution to 
a difficult situation. Other states, however, rejected it both because of its high cost and 
on the basis of principle. Some states argued that using private security company to 
fulfill an international public responsibility was a shirking of that responsibility. Those 
who supported the option riposted that principle was fine if you were willing to act on 
it; otherwise, pursue practical solutions. The end result of the consideration of these 
various options lends credence to this practicality argument. 
On November 30, the Security Council asked DPKO to continue its investigation of 
options. Discussions in the Council and in the corridors clearly favoured option B 
among the three. The US, in discussions with DPKO, expressed their support in 
principle for Option B, and noted that on the basis of their own assessment that the 
force should have as its backbone one strong, well-equipped battalion. When DPKO 
asked if the US was offering to supply such a battalion, they received a curt no in 
response, as well as a list of countries which the US felt were capable and might be 
willing to supply the battalion. However, at the same time, the Security Council 
requested that DPKO look further into the question of supporting Zaire's troops in the 
provision of protection. Clearly, the Security Council was sensing the difficulties of 
actually establishing a peacekeeping force for the camps, and wanted to keep its options 
open. 
A joint DPKO I UNHCR mission was sent to Rwanda to assess the appropriateness of 
the various suggestions made to date, and in particular option B, the "salami" option. 
The mission found that the task was in fact more difficult than anticipated and would 
require more troops - between five and seven thousand, rather than three to five - than 
suggested. Simultaneously, DPKO began the process of approaching states for troop 
contributions. Of a list of 60 states approaches to contribute troops, only one gave a 
positive response. The forces of the state which did respond positively did not 
correspond to the implicit definition of a "strong" battalion. Option B was dead before 
it was started. 
The lack of available troops corresponded precisely to the unwillingness of the 
UNAMIR TCNs to send their troops into Zaire. Several factors were at work. First, 
Zaire was perceived as a "quagmire", into which entry would be difficult and exit both 
expensive and potentially bloody. Second, nobody's interests were at play, with the 
possible exception of the French, who had already been engaged through Operation 
Turquoise and were not about to re-enter the region. Finally, relatedly, there was no 
great power backing the operation. The conventional wisdom in New York is that to get 
a peacekeeping force approved, you need a great power- essentially, one of the PS - to 
back the plan; this ingredient was absent in the case of the refugee camps in Zaire. Thus, 
although (as argued above) the Security Council had determined the presence of former 
army and militia members in the camps as a threat to international peace and security, 
and claimed juridical authority over them, they were unwilling to act to neutralize the 
threat these people posed both to the refugees and aid workers in Goma and to the long-
term security and stability of the Great Lakes region. 
With no peace-keeping option in the offing, the DPKO followed up on the second part 
of the Security Council's request, ie. to explore the option of providing support to the 
Zairian army in the provision of protection for the camps. DPKO proposed an 
International Police/Military Observer Group, which would marry Zairian troops with an 
international military/police supervisory, training, and observation function. However, 
this option quickly ran into a difficult obstacle: the opposition of Zaire. The reason 
invoked was sovereignty: although Zaire was willing to allow the Security Council to 
send in peacekeeping troops to Zaire, it was unwilling to have its own troops ser-Ve under 
other nations' military authority. 
Finally, in January 1995, the Secretary General acknowledged that the efforts to fmd a 
suitable option for dealing with the situation had failed, and asked the UNHCR to 
unthaw the proposal it had floated in September 1994. This proposal - which became 
the Zairian Camp Security Operation (ZCSO) - was ultimately deployed in February 
1995, a full six months after originally being proposed by the UNHCR. 
The timing of these deliberations suggest that the INGOs press release on November 5th 
had little impact on the search for a solution within the UN Secretariat. However, there 
is some evidence that the INGOs' action increased awareness of the issue among 
governments, which translated into increased awareness at the Security Council. 
Ultimately, however, the Security Council was unable to muster the will to develop a 
robust solution, and fell back onto the solution proposed by the UNHCR weeks before 
the INGO press release and before DPKO began investigating options. 
What remains for speculation is whether the INGO community could have had a more 
substantive impact had they been better informed about UNHCR's proposals. Had they 
lent their public voice to the implementation of the UNHCR's proposal, this might 
have been implemented sooner rather than the six months it actually took. Given that 
the Zairian Camp Security Operation had at least some positive impact when it was 
deployed in February (JEval,II, ), one can only speculate on the lost opportunity for an 
improved situation had these forces been deployed when originally conceived, which was 
at a period when les genocidiares' control over the camps, while not negligible, was 
certainly substantially weaker than it was by the time of deployment. It is unclear 
whether the INGO community was not well informed about the UNHCR proposal 
because of a lack of communication between UNHCR Geneva/New York and the field, 
or because of a lack of communication between HCR and INGOs in the field, or 
alternatively whether the responsibility for coordinating this sort of issue was between 
HCR headquarters and the various INGO headquarters in Europe and North America, and 
that this was where the breakdown in information and knowledge occurred. What is clear 
is that a coordinated stance by INGOs in the region was rather wasted by not being 
effectively coordinated with other ongoing political negotiations in the broader UN 
system. 
The net effect of all of this was that INGOs and UN agencies were left to continue 
throughout 1994 - and into 1995 and 1996 - to provide relief supplies to camps which 
did not provide conditions in which those supplies could be guaranteed to be delivered to 
the most needy, or in which refugees could make voluntary decisions about repatriation. 
In November of 1996, it is clear what the implications of this were: the former regime 
used their control over the refugee populations and diverted relief supplies to 
reconstitute themselves as a military force inside Zaire, with disastrous consequences. 
This represents a second major failing of the response to the Rwandan genocide and 
humanitarian emergency: having failed. to respond to the conduct of the genocide, 
international humanitarian response then inadvertently made possible a second round of 
the violence. The responsibility for this recycling of the violence, however, lies not 
with the UN agencies and INGOs who delivered relief on the ground into the hands of 
the former regime, but the Security Council and Zaire, who failed to ensure that those 
hands were tied. As the experience of Katale shows, INGOs were left facing a security 
and political situation which was beyond their capacity to tackle. 
PART 3: THEMATIC CONCLUSIONS 
3.1 EARLY WARNING 
The story of early warning of the Rwandan genocide from international devel2pment 
and relief INGOs is easy to tell: there was none. This is not to say that INGOs were 
unaware of a generalised decline in order and security in Kigali, or were unaware of 
escalating atrocities in the countryside during 1992 and 1993. It is to say, however, that 
no INGO, international or local, development or human rights, foresaw the escalation 
of what was in fact a low-level civil war into one of the most intense killing episodes of 
the century. 
INGOs were in good company in their failure to anticipate the genocide. No institution 
of the international community accurately predicted the unfolding of events in Rwanda. 
Some particularly prescient individual analysts, whose full-time job it was to interpret 
political developments, did better: Steve Browning of the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania 
correctly argued as early as 1993 that the Arusha Accords would meet large scale violent 
resistance in Kigali; Michel Moussali of the UNHCR predicted a bloodbath; and a US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer produced a desk-analysis which drew a worst 
case scenario of over half a million dead. Most importantly, General Dallaire of 
UNAMIR relayed evidence of plans for a genocide to the UN in New York in January 
1994. But as institutions - institutions whose function it is to monitor political change -
neither the CIA, nor the State Department, nor any branch of the UN used these 
analyses to anticipate or act on what was to come. 
There is, however, an argument that INGOs have advantages in the early warning game. 
It does not necessarily suggest that INGOs should do better than political, security and 
intelligence organisations, but argues that INGOs have access to a type of information 
these institutions do not, which could usefully be incorporated into an early warning 
system. The argument runs that whereas the UN and diplomatic communities are 
remote from the situation on the ground, girded in capital cities and talking only to 
government sources, INGOs are in the field and talking to local actors, interacting with 
the effected communities. Most important, the theory is that INGOs can communicate 
with local actors in their own language, and to a certain extent from within their own 
culture, through links to local civil society actors. These structural features are thought 
to allow INGOs to 'hear' early warning signals which would not reach the ears of 
diplomats or UN agencies. 
The Rwanda experience does not support this argument. In Rwanda, a number of local 
actors and community groups spoke 'good words' to INGOs in French, and 
simultaneously participated in the planning of the genocide in Kinyarwanda. 23 Despite 
the fact that they were in touch and collaborating with Rwandans throughout the 
society, INGOs gained no insights which gave them any form of early warning of 
potential or actual escalation. 
Moreover, INGOs delivered relief supplies to tens of thousands of men who would later 
participate in the genocide militias, without learning anything about the development of 
that movement. In part, that experience is explained by the fact of a shift to 
emergency operations, with its attendant increased role for expatriates and its 'off-the-
shelf nature. If this is in fact the explanatory variable, it is an important one. Crises 
rarely come out of the blue, but are built up to in stages; as these stages escalate, INGOs 
shift increasingly into emergency operations, reducing their sensitivity to local political 
conditions. Rwanda suggests that as the in-country situation becomes more intense, the 
likelihood of INGOs being able to capture early warnings diminishes, just when it might 
be most critical. 
Rwanda may be a special case: as a society, it is known for its secretiveness, its opacity, 
its exclusion of outsiders. It could well be that the structural features of INGOs can 
provide advantages for early warning in other situations. But Rwanda provides no 
evidence to support this. 
3.2 FORESTALLING 
Given that INGOs had no early warning of the forthcoming genocide, how could they 
have been expected to have attempted to forestall it? Clearly, to forestall an event, you 
need to have expectation of its occurrence. However, historical experience suggests that 
conflicts left unchecked will escalate. Thus, it is reasonable to investigate INGO activity 
from the perspective of efforts to forestall potential escalation. 
There were few examples of INGOs engaging in this type of activity. Three exceptions 
to this were elaborated above: none had any discernible impact on the escalation of the 
crisis. Among international development and relief INGOs, only OXFAM's ENVD 
program can be said to have attempted to forestall a continuation of violence, and was a 
singular failure. The risk of failure is a hallmark of innovation, and OXF AM's program 
is singled out for criticism in this report for no reason other than that it was the only 
program to attempt to forestall an escalation of violence. UN agencies and diplomatic 
missions that engaged in preventive diplomacy efforts in Rwanda ultimately had no 
greater success than did OXF AM; that it tried at all is testimony to its progressive 
programming. 
23Kinyarwanda speakers among the NGO community were (and are) few and far between. 
The difficulties that OXF AM had, however, are equally testimony to the difficulties that 
INGOs are likely to face in engaging in this type of programming. Working with civil 
society actors to prevent violence can be a risky business in situations - such as pertain 
in most of Africa - where civil society is far less independent than its European 
equivalent, and is often either an extension of the state into society, or a form of 
opposition in internal exile. (A superb recent example of this danger was USAID's 
support for a peacebuilding 'INGO' in Burundi, headed by Pierre Buyoya- now President 
Buyoya, after a coup in July 1996.) In Rwanda, most civil society groups and actors 
were either deeply implicated in the planning of the genocide or among its first victims. 
What is more, virtually all international INGOs (and UN agencies) had on their own 
staff men and women who were implicated in the genocide. Thus, both in terms of their 
own capacity and the capacity of their collaborators, INGOs were in fact in a very weak 
position to engage in forestalling exercises. 
3.3 MAPPING AND INTELLIGENCE 
Mapping the possible future developments of a political crisis - which in military terms 
would be called strategic projection - is one of the more difficult tasks an intelligence 
agency can tackle. Humanitarian agencies coping with emergency situations take on a 
very challenging project when they attempt to map when, where and how the 
humanitarian impact of a political crisis will take shape. Nevertheless, it is an essential 
component of the relief system, albeit one for which the responsibility is not clearly 
assigned~ 
In the case of Rwanda, a number of quite accurate intelligence and mapping exercises 
produced scenarios with highly accurate predictions about the nature of future 
developments in the civil war and reasonably accurate guestimates about the number of 
refugees various turns of events would produce. The most accurate by far was that of 
UNREO, whose figure of 1.5 million was substantially closer to the actual number of 
refugees who entered Goma and Bukavu than were other estimates. It is noteworthy that 
the impulse for UNREO's mapping exercise which resulted in this figure, and the 
analytical argument which underlay it, carne from USAID, an agency with some access 
to the intelligence tools of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), especially including 
remote sensing. Access to that type of intelligence capacity is clearly a major advantage 
in attempting to map out crisis scenarios. 
Other actors in the international relief system generated different pieces of 
information, based on reconnaissance missions and other systems of data gathering. But 
nobody in the humanitarian system at the time had responsibility for coordinating 
inputs of this type. Ultimately, UNHCR's understated planning figure for refugees was 
used by other agencies in the system simply because UNHCR is the refugee agency, and 
thus they vet most significant pre-planning or pre-positioning efforts other agencies 
might undertake. 
In Rwanda, it seems clear that the weaknesses in the INGO community's capacity to 
undertake mapping and intelligence had two sources: first, their lack of access to an 
actual intelligence system, as opposed to simple ad hoc intelligence gathering; and 
second, their reliance on the UN to provide guidance in this realm. However, it is highly 
questionable whether INGOs either could or should attempt to rectify this untenable 
situation by developing their own independent mapping capacity. Even if INGOs had 
had far stronger intelligence and mapping of the crisis than they did, they would still 
have been locked into the UN figures, as both in terms of funding and access, most 
INGOs are enormously dependent on UN agencies in emergency situations. The Rwanda 
experience suggests that the appropriate direction for INGOs to take is to seek a more 
substantive role in the UN systems mapping process, and in particular to gain clear 
access to its results. Some steps in this direction have already been taken with the 
development of the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) at DHA. 
3.4 OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 
From an outsider's view, several things are notable about INGOs operational response to 
the Rwandan emergency. First, from a strictly technical perspective, Rwanda reveals a 
very significant capacity on the part of INGOs to deliver large volumes of emergency 
relief supplies with a minimum of notice and notwithstanding immense logistical 
difficulties. Second, INGOs are extremely self-critical about their own capacity, and as a 
result are engaged in an iterative process of self-critique and learning. Third, INGOs 
have only a very limited capacity to perform on the more political aspects of response 
- early warning, forestalling, mapping, intelligence. Moreover, whereas there is an 
inbuilt technical learning process in most INGOs this does not appear to apply to the 
political dimensions of response. This last point partially explains why INGOs found 
themselves in the paradoxical position of providing relief to a genocidal army in Zaire. 
Far more substantially, however, INGOs found themselves in that position as a result of 
a broad international abdication of state responsibility, both in the form of great power 
disengagement and in the form of state failure. These points can be substantiated in 
turn. 
That INGOs have built up a deep resevoir of operating knowledge, experience, contacts, 
and access which allows for virtually immediate response is evident from the Rwandan 
experience. The access which INGOs gained to vulnerable populations in Rwanda, 
despite severely insecure conditions, was quite extraordinary. The capacity of INGOs (in 
cooperation with UN agencies) to overcome logistical difficulties rivals that of the 
military contingents sent to Goma (though clearly not in the realm of bringing in heavy 
equipment.) One British military officer involved in relief operations inside Rwanda said 
later that he had expected to have to work despite INGOs, and found that he could only 
do his work because of them. The experience of Goma provideds concrete evidence of 
that capacity. While it is certainly the case that the failure of adequate pre-planning left 
agencies scrambling, and arguably contributed to the death toll from cholera and 
dysentry in the camps, the fact of the matter is that UN agencies and INGOs were able 
to meet most of the needs of almost a million people without much advance notice. This 
is not to argue that pre-planning is unimportant, it is simply to note the speed and 
efficiency with which INGOs do respond to crises. 
INGOs responded quickly and for the most part effectively, but INGOs are afso very 
critical of their own operations. A large number of INGOs involved in Rwanda- MSF, 
CARE, Caritas, OXF AM, PSF to name a few - conducted evaluations of their operations 
which critiqued a number of aspects of the technical response, and suggested ways to 
improve future operations. For example, MSF's evaluation was extremely critical of 
their own internal cooperation (ie. between the French, Spanish, and Belgian branches 
of the INGO), and recommended far reaching changes to their coordination structure. 
This despite that fact that other INGOs refer to MSF as one of the fastest and best 
agencies on the ground. Other INGOs were equally critical of their Rwanda operations. 
The important point here is that INGOs actually incorporate these technical lessons 
into future operations. CONCERN, for example, had already by 1995 reorganised their 
emergency logistics pack in response to internal critique about its shortcomings; 
OXFAM's water program in Goma was as successful as it was as quickly as it was 
precisely because that agency has for years been engaged in an iterative process of 
reviewing operations and learning from internal critique. 
The case is different when it comes to political learning, however. This applies less to 
the question of early warning and forestalling, because these are new areas for INGOs, so 
it is much too early to assess their learning capacity there. Rwanda suggests that this 
iterative learning process does not extend either to assesments of the political situations 
in which INGOs operate or the political impact their operations have. Take the issue of 
'refugee warriors', the presence of an armed elements within a refugee camp which 
attempt to control the resources in that camp. This phenomenon is a widespread one, 
which INGOs and UN agencies have tackled in the past. The most notable example was 
in Cambodia, where humanitarian agencies became entangled in providing aid to refugees 
on the Thailand/Cambodia border, in camps which were under the control of the Khmer 
Rouge. This aid was used by the Khmer Rouge to rehabilitate itself as a fighting force, a 
fact which prolonged the deadly conflict in Cambodia. INGOs and UN agencies went 
through a 'lessons learned' exercise in that case, and determined (among other things) 
that an early move to family-based systems of registration would have minimised the 
capacity of the Khmer Rouge to divert supplies. Yet nothing from that experience was 
used to make decisions about providing relief to refugees in Goma, despite the clear 
parallels between the two situations. 
Thus, INGOs have demonstrated a weak capacity for political learning which contrasts 
with their strong capacity for technical adaptation. A fairly large number of the people 
involved in Rwanda, especially at senior levels, were actually involved in either UN or 
INGO operations in Cambodia as welL When the parallel is pointed out to them, many 
remember the situation and recognize its salience. Almost universally, however, they 
admitted that the parallel with Rwanda had not occured to them, and moreover that 
even had they drawn the link, nothing in existing INGO operating procedures would 
have allowed them to act differently. 
The argument here is not that drawing the parallel to Cambodia in June of 1994 would 
have enabled a different operational response to Goma. The argument is rather that 
earlier political experiences should have been put through an iterative learning process, 
and adapted into operating procedures, in the same way that technical issues were and 
are. It is of course more difficult to adapt operating procedures to political questions, as 
these are arguably more various than the technical considerations, as well as less 
concrete. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of refugee warriors is a recurrent one, and 
while lessons have been drawn from past experiences, the experience of Rwanda 
suggests that INGOs have not learned them. Thus they must tackle the question of how 
to extend the excellent technical learning process that guides their operations to a 
political learning process that would keep them out of the quagmires of future Gomas. 
3.5 POLITICS, SECURITY, AND ETHICS IN FAILED STATES 
The quagmire of Goma was not of INGOs' making. It was made, rather, by th~ lethal 
combination of radical state failure of the Habyarimana regime, the deliberate effort of 
the fleeing regime to collapse the Rwandan in a fmal act of this chapter of the genocide, 
the failure of Zaire to act responsibily, and the failure of the Security Council to accept 
residual responsibility for international security in the face of this withering of state 
capacity in the Great Lakes region. Had the Rwandan state not turned to destroy a 
section of its own population; had the Security Council not failed to act to prevent the 
genocide; had the Habyarimana regime not deliberately provoked state collapse in 
Rwanda as it fled; had the Zairian state accepted responsibility for security in Goma; or 
had the Security Council picked up the issue where Zaire failed; had any of these 
transpired, INGOs would not have found themselves the targets of a coup in Katale 
camp. This sequence of events was far outside the mandate or capacity of INGOs to 
control. 
Nevertheless, INGOs were placed - and placed themselves - on the front lines of the 
consequences of this litany of failure, collapse, and neglect. They did so from within an 
operating paradigm of neutral humanitarianism. The existence of a legitimate refugee 
population with serious humanitarian needs sufficed to send INGOs by the dozen - and 
eventually by the hundreds - to Goma and other locations of the Rwandan emergency. 
They went, for the most part, unheedful of the political context into which they were 
entering, and unfocused on the political and security ramifications of their response. 
The consequences are still being felt in the region - as this report is being finalised, the 
international community appears to be gearing up to repeat the mistakes of 1994 - and 
will be for a long time to come. 
It is easy to criticize INGOs willingness to provide aid in Goma despite the political 
context. Alex de Waal at African Rights and others have started to draw attention to 
this and other instances of the long-term political consequences of aid outweighing the 
shorHerm humanitarian good. To many, the answer is just to refuse to provide aid in 
situations where its long-term political consequences are uncertain. But this is too 
simple. There is no Alexandrian sword with which to cut through the Gordian knot of 
state failure and international disengagement. 
The fact of the matter is that INGOs in Goma were faced with a choice between feeding 
a genocidal army and letting almost a million refugees suffer and probably die. Neither 
choice is acceptable. Nor, however, are the choices, or the conditions which create 
them, going to go away. 
To avoid such conundrums in the future, the experience of Rwanda suggests that INGOs 
need to work on four tracks simultaneously. First, INGOs need to enhance their own 
capacity to serve as part of an early warning system in the international community. 
When state failure or collapse does occur, early warning - or even late warning - of the 
collapse will allow some time for political analysis and decisions to be factored into 
response strategies. Second, INGOs must continue their ongoing efforts to retool their 
development operations to play some role in forestalling state failure and state collapse. 
To be effective, this must necessarily be done in communication and preferably 
cooperation with other development and political agents. Third, INGOs need to further 
their initial efforts at playing a proactive role in political and public discourse to 
pressure the Security Council to accept residual responsibility for security in instances of 
state failure and collapse. This should go further than simply getting the Security 
Council to provide military support for humanitarian operations; arguably the Security 
Council needs to accept responsibility, when states neglect it, for creating conditions in 
which the provision of humanitarian aid to legitimate recipients does not entail the 
rehabilitation of armed movements and the recycling of violence. Finally, because the 
reality of post-Cold War politics is that the above three tracks are not likely to come to 
fruition rapidly, INGOs need to engage in the type of long-term, iterative learning 
process on political issues that they excel at in technical spheres. They must begin to 
develop - again, in cooperation with other relevant actors - some operational strategies 
which can minimise the extent to which humanitarian aid can be used to re-fuel a 
conflict when they are faced, as they will be, with Goma-style dilemmas in the future. If 
the crisis and response in Rwanda demonstrates one lesson clearly, it is that there is no 
humanitarian solutions to political failure. Thus while INGOs should further engage in 
the search for political solutions to state failure, they must also but prepare to meet the 
humanitarian consequences in a political astute way. 
APPENDIX 1: THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN THE CIVIL WAR 
On the 1st of October 1990 the Rwandese Patriotic Front, a political movement 
composed of Rwandese refugees in Uganda, launched an armed invasion into northern 
Rwanda. This predominantly Tutsi organisation opposed the stranglehold over Rwandan 
politics held by the Hutu President of the country, Juvenal Habyarimana. Most 
importantly, they objected to his continued refusal to grant refugees of earlier political 
violence in Rwanda the right to return to their country. Frustrated by the failure of 
diplomatic channels to further their search for a means to return to Rwanda, the RPF 
turned to warfare to achieve their goals. 
In the language of international politics, the Rwandan civil war will be recorded as an 
"ethnic" war, as distinct from an ideological one. At a certain level that is of course 
accurate, with the largely Tutsi RPF fighting a largely Hutu regime, and with ethnicity 
used as an important mobilising tool for both sides. A strong distinction, however, is 
inappropriate. In Rwanda the power of ethnicity comes not principally from its 
physical or ethnographic realities - which are relatively weak - but from its malleability 
and susceptibility to mythologisation and manipulation - which are extremely strong. 
Since before the end of colonial rule, ethnicity in Rwanda has been used by competing 
elites as a tool to create divisions among the peasantry, mobilise political support, and 
legitimate their thirst for power. In short, ethnicity is the ideology of Rwandan political 
competition and violence. 
In the 1990s, Rwanda's extremist ideologues put forward a powerful version of the 
mythology of Rwandan ethnicity. In the crude version of history they propagated, the 
Hutu were the indigenous peoples of Rwanda. The Tutsi were an foreign people who had 
invaded from the east and subjected the Hutu people to hundreds of years of oppressive 
rule. Colonial power had supported Tutsi domination until the Hutu people had 
overthrown the combined repression of the Belgians and Tutsi in 1959 to 1962. Hutu 
rule had since kept Rwanda at peace. Now, in 1990 the historic invaders (the RPF), or 
"foreign devils" as they were often referred to, were coming back to attempt to re-
impose their domination, and once again enslave the Hutu people. 
Like all good propaganda, the Hutu extremist message had a kernel of truth to it. Much 
of Rwanda had, during the nineteenth century, come under the authority of a central 
Rwandan kingdom dominated by a Tutsi clan. Under Belgian colonial rule, from 1916 to 
1962, the Tutsi had been used as a comprador class to administer Belgian authority. 
And between 1959 and 1961, a Hutu political movement, the PARMEHUTU, had 
effectively overthrown the Belgian-Tutsi system of rule. 
What was not entirely true was that relations between Tutsi and Hutu had long been one 
of oppressive domination. The existence of a central Rwandan kingdom whose courtiers 
were Tutsi was a reality which covered the more complex reality of a system of sub-
kingships, several of which were led by Hutu kings into the twentieth century. Power in 
Rwandan society was as much, arguably more, a function of clans than of tribes. The 
dominant clans of the late nineteenth century, among them the Abeega and 
Abanyiginya, each contained Tutsi, Hutu (and Twa) members - although it is true that 
the Tutsi were the dominant tribe within these clans. Hierarchy was a function of the 
intersection between lineage, ethnicity, and social function.24 
What is more, the distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi were not those normally 
associated with the concept of a tribe. Although there is some evidence that Tutsi and 
Hutu were once different social groups, by the time Europeans arrived in the mid-
24Moreover, according to-----------, Director of the National Museum in Butare, rule within a court 
was functionally divided, with authority over husbandry accorded to a Tutsi, authority over . 
agriculture accorded to a Hutu, and authority over war accorded to whichever of the two was the 
strongest. This system was stopped by the Belgians after 1920. 
nineteenth century, there were no longer any geographical boundaries between the two -
which lived intermingled in Rwanda's villages and towns- nor any cultural, linguistic, or 
religious differences. The distinctions which remained were partial and fluid. Principal 
among these was social occupation: Hutu were predominantly agriculturists, while the 
Tutsi were predominantly pastoralists. The distinction was thus one of class or caste. A 
secondary distinction was ethnographic: the Tutsi were, stereotypically, a tall, slim, 
light-skinned, fine-featured race, while the Hutu were short, squat, dark, with squashed 
features. Just enough of each group conformed to these stereotypes to keep them alive, 
though intermarriage had long dulled the distinction. Belgium's imposition of identity 
cards as a means of telling the two groups apart ossified Rwandan society by solidifying 
the boundaries between them, which had previously been somewhat fluid (Hutus could, 
under certain circumstances, become Tutsi, and vice versa - which emphasizes the fact 
that the distinctions between the two groups were social more than they were 
ethnographic.) 25 
The weak realities of the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi provided rich ground for 
ideological manipulation. The official line of the RPF, which had a vested interest in 
attracting support ·from a wide spectrum of Habyarimana opponents, was that the 
distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi were so minimal as to be unimportant. To the 
Habyarimana regime, the distinction was central to Rwandan history: to avoid being 
locked once again into slavery, the Hutu people had to rally to the defense against the 
foreign enemy. This simplification of history into the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu 
had the advantage of drawing attention away from other profound divisions in modem 
Rwandan society, especially between Hutus from some northern provinces - which had 
profited under Habyarimana's regime - and Hutus from the south, who were as much 
marginalised under the "2nd Republic" as were Tutsis. 
Writing about the similar ethnic relations in Burundi, Rene Lemarchand, a noted scholar 
of the region, has argued: 
The Hutu-Tutsi conflict is a recent phenomenon, rooted in part in the process 
of social change introduced by the colonial state, in part by the rapid 
mobilisation of ethnic identities under the pressure of electoral competition 
(Lemarchand 1993, 153). 
The essential point on which to be clear is that while there was certainly an element of 
ethnic differentiation in traditional Rwandan society, this was first made rigid through 
Belgian rule, then made competitive in the development of modem elites, and fmally 
violent through elite mobilisation in the pursuit or defense of power in the modem 
Rwandan state. 
Rallying both northern and southern Hutus to the defense of "the Hutu nation" was vital 
to the survival of the Habyarimana government. The strategy had an important 
precedent: the first republic was created when Gregoire Kayibanda, at the head of a 
group of Hutu elites, constructed the PARMEHUTU movement around the 
dissatisfactions of the Hutu peasantry with Belgian-Tutsi rule. Political competition 
between Tutsi and Hutu elites at the end of the colonial period had turned violent, 
ultimately causing an exodus of Tutsis to Tanzania, Burundi, and especially Uganda. 
25The question of how distinguishable are the two groups continues to be a source of contention. 
Those who insist on the physical distinctiveness of the two groups point to the current Vice 
·President and strong man ofRwnada, Paul Kagame, who has all ofthe classic featuresofa TutsL 
Those who reject the distinction point to various other members of the RPF leadership, whether 
Mazimhaka, Rutayisire, or Rusegera, none of whom conform much to the stereotype. The reality of 
pre-genocide Rwandan society was perhaps best expressed in a Rwandan joke, which pokes fun at 
wazungus (whites) incapacity to tell Africans apart, admonishing the wazungus for only being able to 
distinguish the ethnicity of one Rwandan in ten. We Rwandans are more perceptive, the joke asserts: 
we can tell three in ten. 
It is in this exodus of Tutsis that we find the particular roots of the 1990 civil war 
(JEval,II,Chl). The majority of members of the Rwandese Patriotic Front were 
descendants of the Tutsis who fled the violence of the revolution and independence 
struggles. Major-General Paul Kagame, who led the RPF for most of the four years of 
civil war, talks of his experience as a child in fleeing Rwanda with his parents, and 
making a home with other exiles in southern Uganda. Kagame and his contemporaries in 
Uganda had participated in the attempts of the generation above them to win the right 
of return through diplomacy. As these attempts repeatedly failed, they organised into a 
rebel group, and in 1990 launched their invasion. 
APPENDIX 2: CIVIL SOCIETY & HUMAN RIGHTS INGOS IN PRE-GENOCIDE 
RWANDA 
As documented in the Joint Evaluation (JEval, II, Ch.2, Sect. 2), the years leading up to 
the genocide saw Rwanda exposed to the scrutiny of local and international human 
rights INGOs, the UN human rights machinery, and western diplomatic missions in 
Kigali and Nairobi. The principal focus of attention was human rights abuses by the 
government, and to a far lesser extent the RPF. 
The effort to reveal and document human rights abuses by the government focused on a 
series of unlawful detentions and 'disappearances' of Tutsis. In early October 1990, 
immediately following the RPF invasion, some 7000 Tutsis were detained in Kigali and 
in various northern town, essentially as hostages to be held against any further RPF 
advance. Throughout the next year and a half, 'disappearances' of several hundred 
Tutsis from regions in the north occurred roughly once every two months. These were 
documented by such international human rights agencies as Human Rights Watch, 
African Rights, and Amnesty International, drawing on a quite robust local human rights 
movement. Indeed, at the time it was often noted that Rwanda had a surprisingly broad 
spectrum of human rights agencies which were heavily involved - often with 
considerable risk - in tracking human rights abuses. Collaboration between the two 
groups followed established patterns of the local actors having a natural lead in tracking 
abuse and the international actors taking the lead in publicising those in the 
international arena and attempting to put pressure on the responsible government and 
relevant international actors, such as the UN. 
The most significant human rights intervention came in 1992/3 in the form of a 
collaborative investigation conducted by a consortium of Rwandan and international 
human rights agencies (the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH). This 
produced a comprehensive document citing numerous cases of disappearances, and 
establishing that the abuses followed a pattern which was, in a legal sense, genocidal, and 
cited the relevant UN instrument for dealing with genocide, the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. At one level the intervention was effective, generating, inter alia, a special 
investigation by a UN human rights rapporteur, M. Ndiaye, who wrote a detailed, 
sophisticated, and damning indictment of the Rwandan government and reiterated the 
relevance of sections of the Genocide Convention. Were this citation of the 
Convention taken seriously by the broader UN machinery, it would have created_ a legal 
basis for intervention to protect the Rwandan citizenry from their own state. However, 
the Ndiaye report was long buried in the mechanics of the UN's human rights 
bureaucracy, and did nothing to raise awareness in the international community. Equally, 
the FIDH's report was little read outside the human rights community. Among the 
diplomatic corps and in the UN agencies, even acute observers of the human rights 
scene report never having seen the FIDH report (JEval, II, p32). Ultimately, the record 
of the human rights agencies in Rwanda in the pre-genocide period is of diligent, brave 
and consistent - but ultimately ineffective - reporting. 
It should be noted that nothing in either the Ndiaye report or any others from 
international human rights institutions in any sense contained early warnings of the 
genocide that occured. At least two institutions, inducting Ndiaye, used the term 
genocide in reporting on Rwanda, but the term was cited in its legal meaning as that is 
defined by the UN Convention on Genocide. That convention allows the term genocide 
to be used any time members of an ethnic or religious group are targeted because of their 
membership in that group. Using the term genocide in this context does not refer to the 
mass killings the word connotes in public usage. Indeed, it is arguable that the fact that 
human rights agencies use the term in its narrow legal sense actually dilutes the impact 
of the term when it is needed, as it was in Rwanda in April 1994. 
Looking back on Rwanda after the genocide, it is clear that part of the failure of human 
rights community in Rwanda stemmed from the highly political nature of'civil society' 
in Rwanda. In the Rwanda context, civil society was not what we take it to be in the 
industrialised west: less the non-partisan leadership of an independent citizenry than ex-
officio political figures who could not be accommodated in the shrinking pockets of the 
state. One diplomat with wide experience in Africa visited Rwanda in late 1993, and 
recalled later that she had never seen such a fractious 'civil society'. Many of the new 
INGOs, she claimed, were often little more than extensions of political parties, and had 
nothing of the depth or breadth that characterised their counterparts in Kenya, to use 
one contrary example. Other more established INGOs which were not connected to 
political parties were nevertheless riven by party politics. When the genocide occured, 
many of the 'human rights' INGOs which made up part of the broad civil society in 
Rwanda proved to be part of the mechanics of genocide. Those who were not part of 
the genocide machine were some of its earliest victims. 
APPENDIX 3: ECONOMIC CHANGE IN RWANDA IN THE 1980S 
To understand the profundity of these changes, it helps to cast back to the period before 
these changes were underway, to the 1980s, and to recall that Rwanda was then 
perceived to be - and to a certain degree was - an island of relative stability and 
international acceptability is a surrounding sea of troubled bordering countries: Zaire in 
the late stages of internal decay; Uganda at only the earliest of stages of recovery from 
a decade of carnage; Tanzania after two decades of villagisation and national socialism 
had withered the resources of that country; and Burundi, which in 1988 experienced yet 
another bout of ethnic warfare. Rwanda had been reasonably stable since 1973, when 
Habyarimana took power in a bloodless coup. Until 1989, Rwanda was also one of the 
few countries in Africa which had managed to avoid the imposition of a Structural 
Adjustment Program, and was highly successful in attracting foreign aid to supplement 
its earnings from coffee, tea, and tourism. The nickname 'Africa's Switzerland' refereed 
not only to its thousand hills, but also to its reputation for peace and stability. 
As later documented by an American scholar, Catherine Newbury, the appearance of 
calm and stability obscured profound underlying tensions (Newbury 1993). First, state-
society relations within the Rwandan polity were not as they seemed; Newbury 
documented the fact that a series of measures taken by the government of President 
Habyarimana, during the 1970s, which on face value ensured equitable access to state 
resources for all tribes were in fact used as tools to give preferential treatment a 
particular segment of society: Bagogwe-clan Hutus mostly from the northern province 
ofRuhengiri and Byumba. This group, known as the akazu or 'little house', controlled 
the political, economic, and military reins of the state to the virtual exclusion and 
common detriment of other elements of Rwandan society. 26 Second, the end of the 
eighties brought a dramatic economic shock which revealed the narrow dependence of 
the Rwandan economy: the international coffee pricing agreement collapsed, with a 
massive negative impact on Rwanda's trade earnings, and thus also on its balance of 
payments and capacity to service its debt. This, in turn, necessitated the start of a 
World Bank Structural Adjustment Program, which produced important dislocations in 
Rwandan society. At the same time, Rwanda began to experience a second, less dramatic 
but equally important economic change: "in the late 1980s, the ratio of rural population 
to unit area of productive land tipped into the red; meaning, Rwanda no longer had the 
land availability to produce enough food for its own population and was threatened by a 
growing annual defecit."27 Rwanda at the end of the 1980s was one of the -poorest 
countries in the world, had the highest population-density in the continent, and had 
experienced a decade's worth of declining land-productivity. Not surprisingly, Rwanda 
also experienced all of the social ills associated with such circumstances, including high 
levels of corruption and high unemployment, especially among youths, resulting by the 
early 1990s in student protests and other forms of political unrest. A short rainy season 
in 1989 also led to wide-spread food shortages, and in some regions famine, in 1990. 
26For example, in 1990 members of the akazu held 80% of command positions in the FAR. 
27cARE International in Rwanda, Report to Atlanta dated February 5 1996. 
